ND 19/CO 1-6 MIDDLE - NEAR EAST CRISIS
(Israel-Arabs-Egypt)

opened 8-5-16

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~Memo~~	~~Benjamin H. Read to Walt Rostow (x ref-SP/FG430-Gruening, Ernest) re Sen.GRuening's speech (SECRET-grp 3)~~ open State 8-22-78 letter	~~12/16/67~~	~~A~~
Memo w/ attachments	John P. Walsh to Walt Rostow re request from prominent person to attend AMERICANS WHO CARE Rally (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 3)	8/24/67	A
Letter w/ attachments	McGeorge Bundy to Ambassador Robert G. Neumann re pro-Arab stand of Afghan govrnment (CONFIDENTIAL)	6/30/67	A
Memo	Dept. of State for the President (x ref-CO 192) re visit of Ahmed Laraki 6/28 (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 3)	6/28/67	A
Letter w/ attachments	McGeorge Bundy to Robert McClintock re Middle East situation (SECRET) partly declassified 3-30-82 more info release 1-21-94 NLJ 91-22	6/21/67	A
~~Note w/ attachment~~	~~Levinson~~ ~~Ken Rosen to Larry re cable from Rabat giving list of factors causing anti-Jewish sentiment in Morocco (CONFIDENTIAL)~~ open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23	~~6/21/67~~	~~A~~
Cable	Embassy, Tripoli, to Sec of State, Wash., re exit & re-entry visas for Jewish residents (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 3)	6/20/67	A
~~Note w/ attachment~~	~~Levinson~~ ~~Ken Rosen to Larry re cable from Rabat re anti Jewish sentiment in Morocco (CONFIDENTIAL)~~ open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23	~~6/20/67~~	~~A~~
~~Memo w/~~	~~Ken Rosen to Larry Levinson re cables re possible atrocities to Jewish population in Mid-Eastern countries (CONFIDENTIAL-grp 3 and CONFIDENTIAL)~~ open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23	~~6/19/67~~	~~A~~

FILE LOCATION

C.F. ND 19/CO 1-6 Middle/Near East Crises

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~Memo w/~~	~~Ken Rosen to Larry Levison re cable from Rabat re King Hassan's position of responsibility towards Jewish community in Morocco (CONFIDENTIAL)~~ open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23	6/17/67	A
~~Memo w/ attachments~~	~~Harold H. Saunders to McGeorge Bundy re interview w/Benjamin Freeman re Middle East policy w/ (SECRET-NO FORDISSEM attachment)~~ open 9-6-91 NLJ 91-205	~~6/16/67~~	~~A~~
~~Memow/ attachments~~	~~Ken Rosen to Larry Levinson re cable from Libya re status of Jewish residents in Libya (CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Exempt per NLJ-82-114 (cable) Tripoli 0092 - open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23 (cable) Tripoli 0091 - open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23 (memo) to Califano from Rosen, exempt NLJ 82-114	~~6/15/67~~	~~A~~
Memo w/ attachments	Harold H. Saunders to Larry Levinson re UAR military refugees in Sinai Desert (CONFIDENTIAL) open 3-11-86 NLJ 86-22	6/14/67	A
Memo w/ attachments	Dick Moose to Ben Read re approved text of cable to Embassy, Bonn, for Springer (CONFIDENTIAL)	6/14/67	A
Memo	FBI Director to Pres., etc. re Middle East situation (SECRET-NOFORN) ~~exempt red letter 12-22-81 to NLJ 81-168~~ sanitized 9-6-91 NLJ 91-205	6/14/67	A
Memo w/ attachments	American Consul, Jerusalem, to American Embassy, Athens, re Yates body (CONFIDENTIAL)	6/7/67	A
~~Memo w/ attachments~~	~~Leonard C. Meeker to Joe Califano re neutrality & belligerency in Near East Conflict (CONFIDENTIAL)~~ open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23	~~6/6/67~~	~~A~~
~~Memo w/ attachments~~	~~Benjamin H. Read to Walt Rostow re Arab-American Group request for apptmt. w/Pres. to discuss Middle East. Action Com. onAmerican Arab Relations (CONFIDENTIAL)~~ open 2-3-86 NLJ 86-23	~~6/5/67~~	~~A~~

FILE LOCATION

C.F. ND 19/CO 1-6 Middle/Near East Crisses

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo	Leonard H. Marks to President (x ref FG 296-1) re VOA transmitting facilities at Tangier (CONFIDENTIAL) Open 2-11-82	6/2/67	A
Memo w/ attachments	Walt Rostow to President re Javits' suggestion of having Congressional briefing re Middle East situation (CONFIDENTIAL) Open 3-30-82	5/28/67	A
Memo	Benjamin H. Read to Robert Kintner (x ref FG 100/ MG) re 5/31 cabinet meeting (CONFIDENTIAL) Open 9-6-82	5/26/67	A
Memo w/ attachment	Bromley Smith to President re denial of report that Jordan has declared war on Israel (CONFIDENTIAL) grp 3) Open 2-4-92 NLJ 91-207	5/24/67	A
Memo w/ attachment	Walt Rostow to Marvin Watson re Malcolm Tarlov's call on Pres. (SECRET) Open 8/11/81	5/24/67	A

FILE LOCATION
C.F. ND 19/CO 1-6 Middle/Near East Crises

RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

gulh/hcc

By mine C. F. (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, January 2, 1969
10:15 a.m.

ND 19/CO 1-6
CO 126
CO 162
RM 3-2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Ernest Goldstein

Mr. President:

As you are undoubtedly aware, the major American Jewish organizations are deeply hurt by what they consider to be a new U.S. double standard in its policy toward Israel.

To be specific ---they can understand our condemnation of the action taken in Beirut. They cannot understand why Walt on TV implied that use of Israeli regular forces to destroy property was more reprehensible than use of Arab Fedayeen Forces to destroy life, injure persons and destroy property. They read a great deal into Walt's emphasis on "Regular Forces."

Their second complaint is that the U.S. did not forcefully condemn the attack on the El Al liner and its passengers in Athens before Beirut took place. They consider McCloskey's statement about Athens, made only after Israel was condemned at the U.N., to be weak and wispy.

The general view is that for the first time in your Presidency even handed justice has not been dispensed.

The critics are saying that they are sure that you were not given a full review of the facts at long distance. They believe that if you had all the facts you would have been your usual just self.

In my opinion the public record does support the critics' view that we have evidenced in this case a double standard. I therefore recommend that in one of George's press briefings he take the occasion to make it clear that you deplore the loss of life at Athens and the resort to such attacks on civil aircraft by regular and guerilla forces alike.

Ernest Goldstein

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By TL On 10-7-81

RECEIVED
JAN 3 1969
CENTRAL FILES

goals/

C. F. (15)

FG 11-8
FG 1
FG 795
FG 100
FI 4
FI 11-4
FO
ND 19/CO 1-6
ND 19/CO 312
FO 7/Vietnam Meetings #3
ND 21
FG 535
RA 2
PL/Nixon, Richard
PR 8-1/N *

AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT
NIXON, Richard *

I. Presidential Business
   a. History
   b. Photographs
   c. Movies
   d. Notes
   e. Diary

II ✓ Violence Commission

III Each Cabinet Officer (To come in)

IV. Budget and Surtax

V. Foreign Affairs
   a. Middle East
   b. Vietnam
   c. Peace Talks
   d. Summit Conference
   e. Nonproliferation Treaty

VI. Chief Justice

VII. William X Scranton - come see the President.

VIII. House for the Vice President

RECEIVED
JAN 3 1969
CENTRAL FILES

C. F.

JL3/C013

ND19/C01-6

August 5, 1968

Dear Josh:

The President appreciates the concern which prompted your telegram of July 30.

As you have pointed out, relations between the United States and Algeria were broken following the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. Nevertheless, you may assure your constituents that, within the limitation imposed by the rupture of our diplomatic relations with Algeria, their Government has urgently pressed through a number of diplomatic and other channels for the release of the El Al airliner and its occupants now held in Algeria.

We believe it is essential to the maintenance of order and safety in international travel that illegal seizures of this kind not be condoned. We are continuing to follow the situation closely, have consulted fully with Israel and other interested governments and organizations, and remain hopeful of a successful outcome.

Sincerely,

Barefoot Sanders
Legislative Counsel
to the President

Honorable Joshua Eilberg
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

C. F.

INFORMATION MEMO:
CL/dg
June 4, 1968

PE	HU 2
FG 105	ND 19/CO 1-6
FG 753	PA 3
CO 232	NR
FO 5-2	PC 1
PL 3	FG 293
CO 235	ND 21
FG 105-6	DI 2
BE 6	NR 7
FG 11-6	DI 5/ST 5
FG 11-8-1/McPherson	

Box no. 1412 containing the following material sent to Central Files, June 4, 1968

from Mr. McPherson's office:

Mexican-Americans
Mideast
National Parks
Natural Resources
Negro Data
Non-Proliferation Treaty
Northeast Drought
OEP
xOtepka, Otto F.
Panama Canal
Passport Visa
Patents
xPeabody, Governor Endicott
Peace Corps
Philippines
xPolitics of Morality (Yarmolinsky)
Political Contributions

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

C.F.
CO126
PU1-2
ND19/CO1-6
SP/CO126
CO312

December 22, 1967

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

Marvin Watson

Abraham Multer delivered the mail (see enclosed Congressional Record) and I have been giving the piece maximum distribution. I also asked Louis Martin to get it out (somehow) to all Jewish newspapers.

I have also been giving wide circulation to Stokely Carmichael's statements about Israel (also attached). In addition, I have planted a rumor that Stokely is real ly white.

JL

John P. Roche

June 30, 1967
3:15 p.m.

C.F. (2)
PR16
FG1
ND19/C01-6
ND19/C0312
PL2
ROHNEY, George
NIXON, Richard
ROCKEFELLER, Nelson
FG11-8-1/PANZER, Fred

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

INFO COPIES: GEORGE CHRISTIAN
JIM JONES

FROM: Fred Panzer

SUBJECT: Advance Harris Survey, Sunday and Monday, July 2 and 3

Harris has advanced his release schedule one day to catch maximum weekend coverage. His columns will be helpful. (This was received over the phone from his close associate who did not have the actual columns, in hand so figures are close but couldn't be quoted exactly.)

Sunday Harris Report shows:

-- A big upsurge in the overall LBJ job rating from 47% to 58%.

-- LBJ rating as a man who is working for peace goes up to 67%.

-- LBJ rating for handling the Middle East Crisis is 66% approval.

-- LBJ rating for handling the war in Vietnam goes down a point or two. This means that the big increase of your stance in the Middle East and in the talks with Kosygin, especially among those who have been negative about Viethan -- not "Doves" but those who want to do more.

RECEIVED
JAN 16 1968
CENTRAL FILES

Determined to be an
administrative marking.
By TL On 10-7-81

CONGRESSIONAL

June 27, 1967

C.F.
ND19/CO1-6
SP3-188/Pro/C*
PRS
Muller, Abraham J.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The President and his advisers have given your confidential memorandum on the situation in the Middle East most careful attention, and the President has asked me to thank you for letting him have your recommendations.

Thank you also for your note to the President about his remarks at the Foreign Policy Conference for Educators. Your thoughtfulness was very much appreciated.

Sincerely,

Barefoot Sanders
Legislative Counsel
to the President

Honorable Emanuel Celler
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

jl/jf

RECEIVED
JUN 28 1967
CENTRAL FILES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/21/67

To: Mr. Barefoot Sanders

Returned with thanks.

McG. B.

Seen for appropriate disposition. — W Bundy has seen — for Secretary of Rostow —

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1967

MEMO FOR: McGeorge Bundy

FROM: Barefoot Sanders

Herewith two letters from Chairman Celler to the President (1) containing his views on the Mid-East situation, and (2) complimenting the President on his Monday speech.

Mr. Celler has sent these in lieu of a visit with the President which he requested for himself and Congressman Multer.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S.
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

EMANUEL CELLER
CHAIRMAN

June 20, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

By this time I am sure you are aware of the most favorable reception given your statement of yesterday on the Middle East. I have heard nothing but praise of it from the Members of the House and the Senate.

Respectfully yours,

Emanuel Celler

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM: In re Middle East.

I want to place a few ideas before you.

(1) I was happy to note that Ambassador Goldberg had talked about a third party. I assume he meant it in the sense of a mediator or intermediary between the Arab Nations and Israel. This is a thought I have had since the outbreak of hostilities and I am pleased to see that there were others who thought along the same lines.

(2) No one questions the need that the Arab refugee problem be resolved. It has no doubt come to your attention that there still remain in Arab nations numbers of persons of Jewish faith who are now in a most precarious situation. Some of them have been physically assaulted. In a sense then, they are victims of calamitous events and should be, I believe, brought within a broadened scope of definition of refugees.

Would it not be possible for a country, say, like Luxembourg for example, to call for a meeting of all interested countries to consider the resolution of these problems, means and methods, resettlement and asylum. To this end I know that all voluntary agencies, who have long and varied experience in refugee matters, would be willing to cooperate. Perhaps, too, this country could explore facilities of the Intergovernmental Committee on European Migration, the machinery of which could be utilized.

We have precedents in the Evian and Bermuda Conferences, which had been called in the 1930's for the express purpose of rescuing persecuted minorities during the Nazi regime. While the Evian and Bermuda Conferences were not fruitful, there have been many changes in world opinion concerning refugees since that time.

(3) I have been advised, though not from any authoritative source, that shipments of foods to Israel have stopped. I hope this is not so. We are not faced here with a nation which has broken diplomatic relations.

(4) I am also taking the liberty of suggesting that passport issuance be resumed for travel purposes to Israel. Unless there is evidence of the outbreak of new hostilities, there does not appear to be any apparent reason why travel documents should be withheld from American citizens.

I am adding parenthetically that the USSR has lost considerable support among the intellectuals of the large Communist parties on the European Continent. It could be worth while to explore the uses that could be made of this alienation.

From
Emmanuel Celler

C. F:
ND19/CO1-6
CO303
CO81

(3)

June 22, 1967

Dear Paul:

A line to thank you for your helpful note of June 20, with its enclosure. It gives a good picture of what reasonable men are saying. I hope at least our government will be sensible, too.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

Professor Paul Doty
Department of Chemistry
Harvard University
12 Oxford Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

June 20, 1967

12 Oxford Street
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

VIA AIR MAIL

The Honorable MacGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mac:

I attended a hurriedly called private discussion in Paris last weekend on problems growing out of the Middle East and am enclosing with this letter a summary of what went on. In the interests of brevity it emphasizes almost entirely the contributions of the Soviet and French participants.

While Millionshchikov was obviously prepared for the meeting he seemed unconcerned about most of his government's position except the withdrawal of Israeli troops. His more flexible views on other points may therefore be of some interest. His insistence that Soviet-Chinese relations had become so bad that new opportunities for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Vietnam were possible seemed to represent some movement in this area.

Our own relations were very friendly and I gained the impression that his government contacts admitted to some confusion over the Middle East catastrophe and that he was sent to acquaint himself with relevant but not official views. He was obviously upset by the news of the Chinese thermonuclear explosion and was as perplexed about how this event could have come so soon in spite of the cultural revolution as he was to the motivations for the cultural revolution itself.

Please let me know if I can clarify any points in the summary that may be of interest.

Very sincerely yours,

Paul

Paul Doty

PD/jw
Enc.

Copy no. 3

CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR QUOTATION

MEMORANDUM ON PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN PARIS, JUNE 1967

Paul Doty - 6/20/67

Setting and Participants: About June 7 Marcovich in Paris and Rotblat in London independently suggested that some discussions on the Middle East Crisis and related Arms Control Problems be undertaken by knowledgeable U.S., U.S.S.R. and French citizens who knew each other through the Pugwash meetings. Paris was an obvious site since Kissinger and Feld (U.S.), Artsimovitch (U.S.S.R.) and the French were already there. By the 13th Millionshchikov agreed to come along with a "Middle East expert" and insisted that the discussions include the relation of the crisis to the Vietnam war. The participants assembled on the 16th to arrange an agenda and met during the day of the 17th and the morning of the 18th. The participants were:

France - Francis Perrin (Head of French Atomic Energy Commission), Herbert Marcovich (Institut Pasteur) and Etienne Bauer (Saclay).

Soviet Union - M. D. Millionshchikov (Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences) and Ruben N. Andreasyan (Member of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations).

United States - Bernard Feld (M.I.T.), Henry Kissinger (Harvard) and Paul Doty (Harvard).

United Kingdom - J. Rotblat (Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs).

Artsimovitch had gone to the south of France by the time the group had assembled and was ready to return, but Millionshchikov apparently did not want him to attend and he was never summoned.

The discussions fell into three broad topics: the general situation in the Middle East, views on specific aspects of a settlement and the relation of the crisis to Vietnam. Participants spoke as individuals and their remarks were to be considered confidential. This was to apply to the holding of the meeting as well.

General Situation in the Middle East: Doty began with a general statement which deserves summation because Millionshchikov and Perrin found it generally acceptable. He stressed that the handling of this crisis will be decisive in determining the level of Soviet-U.S. cooperation, reviewed the history of Soviet and U.S. involvement in the Middle East, noted that U.S. interests for strategic reasons had lessened and that Soviet interests had little basis in ideology or security, and concluded that despite the concerns over oil, transportation and secure borders, it was

the momentum developed under different conditions rather than really vital interests that propelled the two great powers into collision in this area. The long history of conflict among the countries here and their habit of seeking outside help or manipulating it when it was forced on them provided a classic trap for great power involvement. Moreover, it was impossible to make a fair and acceptable judgment in such a complex situation. With no universally acknowledged wrongs to set right and with no primary vital interests there were strong reasons for a reassessment by the great powers and this should include a new look at what could be gained by genuine cooperation in working out and enforcing a peace treaty and exerting a positive influence in developing the region. This would involve massive aid to the refugees, a withholding of heavy arms, the absence of nuclear weapons, an insistence that the conflicting parties work out most of the terms of a settlement and an acceptance by both S.U. and U.S. that neither should attempt to dominate the area.

In expressing general agreement with this, Millionshchikov stressed that the military competition in this area is bad and is often "heated from the outside." However, the degree of Soviet-American cooperation envisaged, i.e. open cooperation on a Middle East settlement, is not possible if the present

situation continues in Vietnam.

Perrin noted that a Soviet-American agreement to freeze the situation in 1957 did not hold and that a continuation of a non-cooperating policy would allow Chinese influence to grow. Indeed one had to consider the possibility of the Chinese providing nuclear weapons to the Arabs.

When asked about direct Israeli-Arab talks Millionshchikov said that this stage would have to be reached somewhere on the way to concluding a real peace treaty but that it could not start this way. A negotiator is needed at the beginning and for some time. (No one could suggest who this might be: the French thought deGaulle would not be trusted.) Israel's failure to recognize this suggests she is not interested in meaningful negotiations. It is important to start where we can. The first step could be (some ?) withdrawal by Israel and its recognition by the Arab countries. Then things could proceed from there. This provoked an argument on whether withdrawal without prejudice to final borders was equivalent to Arab recognition. Perrin thought it better for the Arabs to recognize Israel of May 1967 and then negotiate border alterations. There was probably a majority feeling that recognition in the sense of right to live and not as a prelude to a threat of belligerency was a <u>quid pro quo</u> to

withdrawal if that were to be followed by negotiation on all other questions. One should not underestimate the magnitude of this concession by the Arabs since they do not now consider Israel to be a legitimate state but rather a forced Western intrusion into their land.

Specific Aspects of a Settlement: In the course of further discussion the Soviet participants agreed that we cannot return to an armistice, that the aim should be a complete solution this time. There was never any mention of condemning Israel as part of the settlement. Millionshchikov emphasized several times the virtue of exchanging recognition of Israel by the Arabs as the equivalent of withdrawal and that both sides should negotiate after this. The French insisted on the need for demilitarization during the negotiating period. Millionshchikov thought this necessary only if the Israelis do not withdraw. There was general agreement that the status of Jerusalem could be left to the last and was not crucial.

The discussion of the Arab refugee problem was heated. Andreasyan made a strong intervention on behalf of the refugees emphasizing the ruthlessness of their displacement and the folly of thinking that this was compensated by maintaining an equivalent caloric intake. They should be able to return to equivalent living

conditions as near as possible to their original residence. Perrin agreed, and emphasized that the cost of resettlement in an adequate fashion with some provision for earning livelihood and becoming useful citizens would be of the order of $1,000 per person. Andreasyan insisted that each Arab who had been displaced should have choice of complete resettlement in the sense of rehabilitation or equivalent compensation. The French thought that with this kind of resettlement possible the great majority of the Arabs would choose to settle in an Arab country and hence the Israeli fears of population pressure would not be realized. They also insisted that in resettlement whether in Arab countries or in Israel the refugees must be given full citizenship in spirit as well as in deed. Millionshchikov agreed. Feld emphasized the other side, that is that conditions of settlement must be such that they will not be a fifth column but instead be satisfied to find their future there. And Israel in turn must become part of the region and not a Western outpost. In discussing confederation Andreasyan felt the need for some external supervision as one must expect the possibility that the Israelis will outwit the Arabs under any set of common rules.

With respect to arms limitations Perrin said that an agreement to eliminate heavy weapons (tanks, planes and artillery) faced at

least two big obstacles. An embargo would be very difficult to maintain and may be misapplied as the French did in the Spanish Civil War. Secondly, one could not expect to withdraw all such weapons from Israel because she would then be at the mercy of millions of foot soldiers. It would be very difficult to determine what quantity of heavy arms for Israel would counterbalance this and yet not allow a recurrence of last week's war. And there is the problem of differentiating between Israel's three Arab neighbors and the more distant Arab countries who would argue that they have done nothing to justify their being included in an arms limitation. Yet they could be a convenient and quick source of supply.

There was general agreement that Israel would now be very prone to develop nuclear weapons and would not want this right removed even in a peace treaty. Yet in the long run, it was agreed, this would induce the Arabs to get such weapons and this would be to Israel's long term disadvantage. There was little interest in the suggestion that Israel's access to a very few weapons might be the counterpoint to the argument that she can never risk losing a war and allow a symmetrical solution to a number of other problems such as those arising from the very great inequality of populations. In the end the Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty seemed the best way out and short of that

the whole region should be made a nuclear-free zone by treaty.

Upon returning again to this subject later Perrin said that it was important for Israel to understand that a few nuclear weapons might not deter Egypt with such a large population. Indeed the Aswan Dam might be a more effective target. And, moreover, chemical and bacteriological warfare must be considered as very potent possibilities because of the low level of hygiene in the Arab countries and the small area and limited water supply in Israel. In any event he could not imagine a satisfactory treaty without a nuclear ban including IAEA controls. Since Israel will object so strongly the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will be forced to view the NPT with greater urgency. Here the key is their reaching agreement on the extent of compromise that they can live with vis-a-vis the non-nuclear, developed nations. More is at stake now than appeared a month ago. If the differences of Vietnam are preventing this agreement on a practical level of compromise that is one more reason to get on quickly with a Vietnam solution. There was agreement between Perrin and a number of others including Millionshchikov, that excessive compromise and additions to the treaty were not necessary. There was no reason, for example, at this stage for a US-USSR roll-back in weapons since that merely diminished the force that might be

available to protect the non-nuclear powers against China. Perrin also spoke of the value of an independent pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers that signed the treaty. But he was reminded that this caused difficulty in protecting NATO bases in non-nuclear countries and at best would only prevent blackmail. Perrin agreed but emphasized the positive points and added that it might be a way to open up discussions with China as this is the only area in which there seems to be any overlap in possible policies. Unfortunately, despite wide support for the treaty in France, the Government attitude was that they simply do not care. Hence the Government could not be induced to do anything to promote it.

Vietnam: Millionshchikov spoke with feeling and apparent sincerity on this subject. He says he tries but still fails to understand the American objection to de-escalation. How can it be prestige when every day that a half million U.S. Army is held at bay by a small, poorly equipped force the American prestige drops another notch. It is the same with the failure of the bombing to achieve any visible result. It only proves China's contention that superior conventional arms are useless. Why does the U.S. think it profitable to risk a Chinese intervention which would put her in an impossible position? Actually with the

U.S.S.R. committed to follow each step of U.S. escalation with one of her own we are only satisfying China, no one else.

He then emphasized that the difference between the Soviet and Chinese positions has recently become very clear and open. This represents a new opportunity. Andreasyan followed with the elaboration that China wants the war to continue, the Soviet Union does not. China wants to use this difference to provoke a US-USSR war. The USSR will not fall for this if it can avoid it. Look how we stayed out of the Dominican Republic affair. Why must we play out the role that China has set for us? But it must be admitted that every US escalation increases the chances for a war between us.

When asked why the US did not take up the Hanoi hints for starting negotiation the Americans gave the conventional answers -- the lack of credibility of an Australian Communist journalist, the intense increase of supply during the TET suspension of bombing, etc. There followed an exchange of views on what individuals thought might be possible next steps. Generally, these began with a cessation of bombing in the North followed by a variety of reciprocal second steps. The French said that they felt that there might be a possible role for a Frenchman to act as intermediary and suggested that the Soviets consider

offering to act in such a role as well. Both felt that the misunderstandings of the past attempts were such as to make the need of a reliable intermediary necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

21 June

Larry:
attached is a cable from Rabat giving a list of factors causing anti-Jewish sentiment in Morocco. The Ambassador still insists that Hassan will protect the Jewish population provided they remain loyal to the regime.

Ken Rosen

RECEIVED
JUN 23 1967
CENTRAL FILES

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* C. F. 1a

NND 19/C01-6

9 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

017171

1967 JUN 21 AM 4 58

Action AF

Info SS GPM SP SC SAH L H EUR NEA IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD ACDA AID TRSY RSR RSC

VZCZCDKA768
RR RUEHC
DE RUDKBT 5631 1720730
ZNY CCCCC
R 210700Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO ZEN/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
ZEN/AMCONSUL TANGIER
STATE GRNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By LR, NARS, Date 2-3-86

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ RABAT 5631

1. RECENT EVENTS IN ME HAVE PRODUCED A WAVE OF ANTI-JEWISH FEELING IN PRINCIPAL MOROCCAN CITIES WHERE THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF COUNTRY'S APPROXIMATELY 60,000-70,000 JEWS NOT LIVE. VITRILOIC TONE OF ISTIQLAL PRESS AND SOME OTHER PAPERS HAVE INCREASED TENSIONS BUT THIS FEELING OF HOSTILITY HAS BEEN CAUSED BY A NUMBER OF OTHER FACTORS:

A. THOSE CITIES WITH LARGE JEWISH COMMUNITIES, SUCH AS CASABLANCA, RABAT, FEZ, MEKNES AND TANGIER, ALSO CONTAIN THE MOST RABID AND ARTICULATE PRO ARAB SEGMENT OF MOROCCO'S POPULATION. THUS NATURAL ANTAGONISM UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN JEWISH POUPLATION AND SUCH GROUPS AS ISTIQLAL-DOMINATED ARAB YOUTH IN FEZ AND

PAGE 2 RUDKBT 5631 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

RABAT, AND UMT CADRES IN CASABLANCA, ARE EMPHASIZED AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCIDENTS MORE PREVALENT.

B. UNLIKE EASTERN ARAB STATES WHO FACED SIMILAR SITUATION IN 1947 AND 1956, THIS IS MOROCCO'S FIRST EXPERIENCE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE WITH THE ZIONIST/JEWISH PROBLEM. IN VIEW ISRAEL'S CONSTANT REITERATION THAT ALL JEWS SHOULD BE ZIONISTS, IT IS HARD FOR ARAB-ORIENTATED MOROCCAN YOUTH TO ACCEPT FACT THAT JEWS MAY BE LOYAL CITIZENS. IN TIME OF WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ARABS, DISTINCTION BETWEEN ZIONIST AND JEW TENDS TO BLUR.

C. IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY TRUE THAT SOME MOROCCAN JEWS ARE ZIONISTS, HAVE BEEN EXPORTING CAPITAL ABROAD, (PRIMARILY FOR THEIR OWN USE HOWEVER), AND HAVE ILL-CONCEALED THEIR PLEASURE AT ISRAEL VICTORY OVER UAR.

D. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS HAVE CERTAINLY HAD SOME INFLUENCE: ARAB BUSINESSMEN ARE NOT AVERSE TO SEEING THEIR JEWISH COMPETITORS LOSING BUSINESS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. IN THE FACE OF THIS SITUATION, KING HASSAN AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAVE MAINTAINED, REAFFIRMED AND CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENTED MOROCCO'S TRADITIONAL POLICY OF PROTECTING

PAGE RUDKBT 5631 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
ITS JEWISH CITIZENS SO LONG AS THEY BEHAVE AS LOYAL MOROCCANS (SEE RABAT 5565, 5566 AND PREVIOUS). ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS OF HARRASSMENT OF JEWS, GOM HAS MADE MAJOR AND ON THE WHOLE SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO PROTECT JEWISH CITIZENS, AT CONSIDERABLE COST TO ITS POPULARITY IN PRESENT STILL EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE. IN RECENT TALK WITH DCM, MCNINTERIOR SECGEN JORIO SAID GOM NOW HAS SITUATION FIRMLY IN HAND, ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED ATMOSPHERE OF LIMITED STRESS TO CONTINUE FOR 10 MORE DAYS. AFTER THAT, HE FELT IT WOULD RETURN TO NORMAL. JORIO ADMITTED SOME JEWS WERE LEAVING (AND GOM MAKING NO ATTEMPT TO STOP THEM) BUT CLAIMED THAT MOST OF THESE WERE GOING ON EARLY VACATION UNTIL POPULAR TEMPERS COOL. SAID CALM OF AUTHORTIES PLUS NO INTERFERENCE WITH ANY JEW WHO WISHED TO LEAVE HAD HELPED LESSEN THE FEARS OF JEWISH COMMUNITY. JORIO SAID THAT IN ORDER SHOW GOM CONFIDENCE IN ITS JEWISH POPULATION, SENIOR MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL OF JEWISH RELIGION BEING SENT AS GOM REPRESENTATIVE TO FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE IN EUROPE ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. TASCA
BT

C. F.
ND 19/CO 1-6
MC
FG 11-8-1/Rache, John
PR 14

June 21, 1967 CO303

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I went to a (well-packed) meeting of the National Executive Committee of Americans for Democratic Action last night. For once, our trade-union friends delivered their members in the flesh--they never opened their mouths for five hours, but they voted right every time.

Galbraith seems to be on leave as Chairman, but a somewhat dyspeptic Joe Rauh was very much in evidence.

The first item on the agenda was a draft resolution on the Middle East prepared by the opposition. It read as though prepared by a task force of 6 FSO 1s on the edge of mandatory retirement.

I had more fun than I have had in years. I tore it to shreds, pointed out that the Russians were not even mentioned, that it contained no commendation of the Administration's policy, that it was internally inconsistent, in fact, "sheer mush."

Rauh and a couple of others tried to defend it. Then Gus Tyler again sliced it up. I will condense about 2 1/2 hours by saying that we sent a committee off to rewrite it along different lines.

The committee came back with a different resolution (including a ferocious blast at the U.S.S.R.), but insisted on sticking in a final sentence that coupled support of your Middle Eastern policy with condemnation of your Vietnam policy.

We moved to delete the last two sentences and the argument took off for another hour and a half. When the vote was taken all the

cc: Marvin Watson

Copy to Carol Currie - Water

silent members voted right and we won by 2-1. The final resolution is enclosed.

It was now eleven, but we were not going to waste that 2-1 majority.

So we raised the issue of the "Back a Peacenik in 68" Resolution passed by the last National Board. Tyler led off on the absurdity of the statement--suggesting that no responsible trade unionist would associate with an organization that took such a preposterous position.

Again Rauh tried to defend it--arguing it was "sloppily drafted." I pointed out that its authors were (at least on their own say-so) the most talented writers in the country.

But the main grounds on which I attacked were procedural--namely, that it violated both in form and in content the guidelines established by the membership in Convention assembled.

We moved that it be reconsidered at the next Board meeting and--sometime around half past one--this was agreed to and we went home.

John P. Roche

P.S. Although he doesn't know it yet, Joe Resnick is scheduled to put this in the Record with an appropriate introduction (by me).

Americans for Democratic Action
1223 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

ADA Policy Position Adopted by
National Executive Committee
June 20, 1967

FOREIGN POLICY

THE MIDDLE EAST

I - Reason for Concern

ADA is greatly concerned with the problems of instability and human suffering that are now so painfully evident in the Middle East. It is concerned that Israel's future security should not become a pawn of Great Power confrontations in the area; that the instrumental functions of the United Nations should be fully utilized; and that the resolution of conflicts in the Middle East should be reached through intensive negotiation by all States in the area.

II - ADA's Perspectives

It is imperative that a durable and equitable settlement be pursued in the Middle East. In seeking for it ADA identifies itself with the following axioms of policy:

(a) The territorial integrity of every nation within the U. N. must be firmly and legally respected. So, too, must the principle of free and innocent passage in international waterways.

(b) Under Article 51 of the U. N. Charter, Israel was fully entitled to take measures necessary for its self-defense. Naturally sympathetic to the Israelis' defense of their democratic system against the belligerent threats of their neighbors, ADA is convinced that a lasting and equitable settlement of the present conflict cannot be achieved until the sovereignty of Israel and of its frontiers is respected in law and in fact.

(c) ADA condemns the callous attacks upon Israel indulged in or prompted by Soviet officials. The viciousness of these assaults reflect a contempt for the procedures of debate in the U. N. and a genocidal attitude towards Israel's destruction.

(d) A humane solution to the desperate problem of displaced Arab communities will be found only if all countries in the area should agree to a permanent armistice, to a just revision of frontiers, and to a rapid plan for economic resettlement and expansion.

(e) The intervention of the Great Powers in this settlement should be actively discouraged. A settlement dictated by cold war interests and massive military assistance can only be ephemeral. Agreement must come, therefore, between the indigenous States. Only they can determine whether tensions are to be relaxed, arms races are to be dampened, and disinterested economic growth is to be fostered. It is the responsibility of the Great Powers to ensure that all deliberate speed be used to bring the States of the Middle East together and to promote negotiations for a just settlement.

(f) It is unrealistic to demand that the U. N. should impose peace upon the region or force an agreement between the Great and small powers embroiled in the conflict. The U. N. can serve as a vital instrument in bringing States together and in policing agreements which eventually emerge. Every effort must be made to relieve the U. N. of intractable disputes so that its functions of truce supervision, peace keeping, and collective economic expansion can be promoted.

III - ADA Calls for Action

Bearing these axioms in mind, ADA calls upon the U. S. Government to pursue those courses of action that will most rapidly involve the States in the region in a permanent and just disposition of their conflicts. Utilizing all deliberate speed to bring these States together, the U. S. should reaffirm that it is motivated by the following concerns:

(a) The sovereignty of all nations and of their mutually agreed frontiers must be fully respected. A "state of belligerency" cannot persist between one U. N. member and another, and it is inconsistent with the spirit of the U. N. Charter to force any member -- such as Israel -- to accept frontiers that are neither just nor secure.

(b) International waterways, such as the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal, must remain open to the free and innocent passage of ships of all nations.

(c) The revision of boundaries, the resettlement of population, and the protection of ethnic minority rights must be first determined in a cooperative manner by indigenous States and then implemented under the supervision of U. N. agencies.

(d) The military non-intervention in Middle East affairs by outside States should be guaranteed by U. N. inspection procedures.

(e) Massive economic and agricultural assistance must be provided in the immediate future. Once an armistice and a non-intervention agreement have been signed, it is vital that life-sustaining assistance should be channelled through multilateral institutions.

(f) Region-wide institutions (along the lines of the Asian Bank) must be encouraged to bridge the gap between the rich and the pauperized Arab nations and to plan the economic development of the area in a truly collective manner.

(g) The truce supervision, peace keeping, humanitarian, and economic development functions of the U. N. must be firmly consolidated and adequately financed. The U. S. must make a generous and unconditional offer to help finance any reasonable scheme for international development.

(h) Until such time as these agreements have been obtained and implemented, ADA calls upon the U. S. Government to act in a manner that will avoid as far as possible the following pitfalls. It must <u>not</u>

---exacerbate Great Power tensions and rivalry;

---undermine Israel's survival capabilities;

---delay immediate sustenance for the Arab people;

---provoke Arab antagonisms and revenge seeking;

---deadlock or by-pass the authority of the U. N.;

---seek temporary compromises at the cost of obtaining long-range agreements.

ADA expresses confidence that the President will continue to handle Middle East affairs with the restraint and sense of justice that has so far been demonstrated.

# # #

EF
MC

C. F. (3)
ND19/C01-6
C0305
ND19/C0312

June 21, 1967

Dear Bob:

This is just a line to thank you for your very thoughtful letter on the Middle East situation. I am glad to have your suggestions, and we are taking a good look at them.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Robert McClintock
The Embassy of the United States
London, England

RECEIVED
AUG 1967
CENTRAL FILES

Yellow Cy not in C F 8/31/67

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter	attachment to McGeorge Bundy to Robert McClintock, June 21, 1967: Robert McClintock to McGeorge Bundy, June 12, 1967, Secret, 4 pp.	6-12-67	A+C

FILE LOCATION

C.F. CO 19/CO 1-6

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7122 (7-72)

~~SECRET~~

Herewith is an abbreviated summary of my letter to McGeorge Bundy, dated London, June 12, 1967.

1. Vietnam

Following Soviet loss of face in the Near East, the United States has a brief but present opportunity to enlist Soviet assistance in putting pressure on Hanoi to come to a de facto arrangement in Vietnam on the basis of an ad hoc armistice, using the formula, "no victor, no vanquished". The Russians having lost face in the Near East might now be disposed to gain face in Southeast Asia. As a concomitant of this formula, however, the United States, without making any public statement, would at least for the time being suspend bombing of North Vietnam.

2. Peace in the Near East

By an informal sort of public plebiscite, Nasser has been reaffirmed as the top Arab leader, despite his catastrophic defeat. He is the only Arab who can in fact negotiate a lasting peace with Israel. His opposite number in such a colloquy would appropriately be General Dayan, also a young soldier. Although Israel would probably insist upon its territorial acquisitions, including the west bank of the Jordan River, it should nevertheless face up to its responsibilities for the Arab refugee problem. There is outlined a possible solution of this problem, involving cash payments to the refugees and resettlement in Mesopotamia.

Robert McClintock.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State ltr 1-29-82 re NLJ 81-170
By DCH ; NARS, Date 3-30-82

June 20, 1967

~~SECRET~~

McGB:

On the Mid-East sections of the attached, I have the following comments:

1. We've been over the difficulties our making a deal with Nasser poses for us. The main obstacle to Mr. McClintock's suggestion is that Nasser seems in no mood to sit down with Dayan.

2. I think the Israelis--as their only hope for any peaceful settlement--have to assume responsibility for the refugees now, whether they keep Gaza and the West Bank or not.

3. On refugees, I propose the Johnson Plan to the "McClintock Plan" on compensation! However, here's another recommendation for using land development, World Bank--he mentions TVA-like arrangements--as a cover for refugee resettlement. I believe this has merit as part of a larger refugee settlement.

HHS

Would you acknowledge for draft memo and memorandum for my sig

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-212
By ___, NARA, Date 1-7-94

~~SECRET~~

3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20 June 67

Larry:
attached is a cable from Rabat reporting recent anti-Jewish sentiment in Morocco. Paras 3 & 4 pertain to this matter.
We still have no word on the Commission / atrocities against the Jewish community in Syria.

X
Ken Rosen

RECEIVED
JUN 23 1967
CENTRAL FILES

C.F. 3a (1) CF

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State NO19/C01-6

53

CONFIDENTIAL

016091

Action
AF
Info
SS
GPM
SP
SC
SAH
L
H
EUR
NEA
IO
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
ACDA
AID
OIC
TRSY
RSR
RSC

TCIUIM NATAGNMZCQEATAVZCZCDKA637
RR RUEHC RUEHDT
DE RUDKBT 5603 1716755
ZNY CCCCC
R 260730Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA
RUQSKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUDKMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS
RUEHDT/US MISSION USUN
ZEN/ACMONGEN CASABLANCA
ZEN/AMCONGEN TANGIER
STATE GRNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By ____, NARS, Date 2-3-86

PAGE 2 RUDKBT 5603

1. EMBASSY HAS APPROACHED GOM AUTHORITIES IN EFFORT LIMIT DISTRIBUTION OF UAR "WHITE PAPER" WHICH PURPORTS DOCUMENT US INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES.

2. EMBASSY HAS NOW LEARNED THAT EARLY IN PRESENT CRISIS GOM PLACED 165 UNFP MILITANTS AND SYMPATHIZERS UNDER DETENTION. MAJORITY SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED BUT FEW OF HARD CORE GIVEN LIGHT PRISON TERMS.

3. BANNED ISTIQLAL PAPERS "L'OPINION" AND "AL ALAM" AND INDEPENDENT "AL MASSA" REAPPEARED NEWS STANDS JUNE 17 AFTER TWO DAY ABSENCE. INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE SHRILLNESS ANTI-JEWISH COMMENTARY HAS BEEN TEMPERED SLIGHTLY ALL THREE PAPERS ALTHOUGH "L'OPINION" AGAIN BANNED JUNE 19.

4. CONGENS CASABLANCA AND TANGIER REPORT NO SERIOUS INCIDENTS BUT ANTI-JEWISH REACTIONS TO NEAR EAST EVENTS CONTINUE IN BOTH CITIES IN SPITE OFFICIAL GOM ATTEMPTS FOSTER TOLERANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

C.F. (F0)
ND19/C01-6

4

19 June 1967

MEMORANDUM TO LARRY LEVINSON

Attached are two more cables dealing with possible atrocities to Jewish population in Mid-Eastern countries.

Please let us know if you want us to continue servicing you with these cables.

Ken Rosen

Attachments: State 212058

Tunis 4839

RECEIVED
JUN 23 1967
CENTRAL FILES

Ken Rosen
ND 19/CD 1-6
4a

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By MQ, NARS, Date 2-3-86

Action AF

Info SS GPM SP SC SAH L H EUR NEA IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD ACDA AID PC CU SR ORM TRSY RSR RSC

NNNNVZCZCDKA391
RR RUEHC
DE RUDKKR 4839 1680930
ZNY CCCCC
R 170850Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
STATE GRNC
BT

014649 1967 JUN 17 AM 8 28

MAYOR
BOWDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENY
KOMER
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WIGGINS

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TUNIS 4839

SUBJECT: JUNE 5 ANTI-JEWISH DEMONSTRATIONS

1. SEVERAL PAPERS JUNE 16 CARRIED FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

QUOTE A PARISIAN DAILY HASJUST PUBLISHED IN ITS LETTERS TO EDITOR, FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS WHICH STATE DEMONSTRATIONS OFJUNE 5 IN TUNIS WERE NOT SPONTANEOUS BUT THAT 'ON THE CONTRARY WERE CONCERTED AND PREMEDITATED ACTIONS MINUTELY PREPARED FROM ON

PAGE 2 RUDKKR 4839 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

HIGH' (EMBASSY NOTE: LE MONDE OF JUNE 15). TO THESE ALLEGATIONS, AUTHORIZED SOURCES HAVE MADE FORMAL DENIAL. IT IS DEPLORABLE THAT SUCH HASTY AND EMOTIONAL JUDGMENTSHAVE BEEN MADE BY EYEWITNESSES WHO WERE NO DOUBT UNDER INFLUENCE OF PANIC WHICH FOLLOWED ANNOUNCEMENT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION.
QUOTE AUTHORIZED SOURCES ADMIT THAT TAKING ADVANTAGE OFPOPULAR EMOTION RESULTING FROM OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES IN NEAR EAST, CERTAIN ELEMENTS CREATED MISUNDERSTANDING IN STREETS BY CRIES OF 'LONG LIVE BOURGUIBA' AND 'LONG LIVE PALESTINE'. IN HEATED CLIMATE OF JUNE 5, SUCH RUSE PROVOKED IRRESOLUTION WHICH EXPLAINSWHY SERVICES OF ORDER WERE MOMENTARILY OVERWHELMED. THE PARTY ACTEDIMMEDIATELY TO CHANNEL DEMONSTRATORS AWAY AND CLEAR LARGE COMMERCIAL STREETS. SAME SOURCES HAVE NOTED THAT IT IS ABSURD TO SUPPOSE THAT PARTY IN POWER COULD HAVE ACTED OTHERWISE IN THESE REGRETTABLE DEMONSTRATIONS. ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENT WAS FROM BEGINNING FIRM AND UNEQUIVOCAL. IT GAVE ORDER TO SECURITY FORCES TO INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY TO GET SITUATION UNDERCONTROL.
QUOTE THE SAME EVENING, PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA CONDEMNED ENERGE-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE RUDKKR 4839 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
TICALLY EXCESSES COMMITTED AND DECLARED HIMSELF PROFOUNDLY
AFFECTED BY IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOUR AND STRAY ELEMENTS WHO
SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH TUNISIAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE. ONE
RECALLS THAT PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA IN HIS SPEECH CONSIDERED
THESE DEMONSTRATIONS AS A PERSONAL AFFRONT AND AN ATTACK AGAINST
PRESTIGE OF THE STATE.
QUTOE AUTHORIZED SOURCES NOTE, NOT WITHOUT ASTONISHMENT, THAT
TERM 'POGROM' WAS USED IN LETTER FROM A GROUP OF 'TUNISIAN
JEWS'. IN REGARD TC THIS, ONE CAN NOTE THAT DEPLORABLE AS
DEMONSTRATIONS OFJUNE 5 WERE, THEYAT NOTIME INCLUDED ACTS
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONS.
QUOTE FINALLY, GESTURE MADE BY PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA IN CHARGING
MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY TOEXPRESSSYMPATHY TO PERSONS WHO
SUFFERED LOSSES IS UNDERLINED. GOVERNMENT EXPRESSED ITS WILLING-
NESS TO GUARANTEE SECURITY OF ALL INHABITANTS WITHOUT DISTINC-
TION OF RACE OR RELIGION. IT IS STRESSED THAT ONE OF CONSIS-
TENT ELEMENTS OFTUNISIANPOLICY IS TO MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
JUDAISM AND ZIONISM. THIS OFFICIAL POSITIONREFLECTS WELL
POPULAR SENTIMENT IN TUNISIA. UNQUOTE

PAGE 4 RUDKKR4839 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
2. COMMENT: STRONG DENIAL OF ANY OFFICIAL COMPLICITY IN
ANTI-JEWISH DEMONSTRATIONS (AND BY IMPLICATION ANTI-UK AND
ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS) IS EVIDENCE OF GOT SENSITIVITY TO SUCH
CHARGESAND DESIRE TO RESTORE ITS SOMEWHAT TARNISHEDIMAGE AS
ISLAND OFPEACEAND STABILITY.

EMBASSY HAS MINUTELY EXAMINED ALL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING MANY
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS, RELATING TO DEMONSTRATIONS AND HAS COME TO
FOLLOWING TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS:

A. OUTBREAK OF WAR CAUGHT GOT AND PARTY BYSURPRISE. THEY
WERE CONVINCEDNASSER WAS BLUFFING AND NOT WELL ENOUGH INFORMED
ON ISRAEL TO EXPECT ATTACK. NON-PARTY ELEMENTS, INCLUDING SOME
INDIVIDUALS OPPOSED TO REGIME, TOOK ADVANTAGE PARTY' TEMPORARY
CONFUSIONTO ORGANIZE YOUNG UNEMPLOYED, WHO MADE UP MAJORITY
DEMONSTRATORS, STUDENTS, AND OTHER ELEMENTS ALL OF WHOM AFFECTED
BY NEWS THAT WAR HAD STARTED.

B. MAXIMUM PARTYINVOLVEMENT WAS INITIAL TOLERANCE OF DEMON-
STRATIONS SINCE TO HAVE IMMEDIATELY OPPOSED THEM CARRIED DANGER

PAGE 5 RUDKKR 4839 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
OF CREATING GREATER VIOLENCE LATER. PARTY SHOCKED THAT THEY TURNED SO VIOLENT.

C. AT MINIMUM, PARTY WAS CAUGHT OFF GUARD BY DEMONSTRATIONS AND TIME IT TOOK TO GET ADEQUATE FORCE INTO CITY RESULT OF BUREAUCRATIC BUNGLING AND FACT THAT DECISION TO SEND IN ARMY ALMOST CERTAINLY HAD TO COME FROM PRESIDENT.

JEWISH COMMUNITY LEADERS, ACCORDING TO DIRECTOR AJDC, FURIOUS WITH LETTER TOLE MONDE AND CONSIDERING ISSUANCE OF DENIAL THAT JEWISH COMMUNITY BELIEVES PARTY HAD HAND IN ORGANIZING DEMONSTRATIONS. JEWISH LEADERS DO BELIEVE PARTY AT LEAST TOLERATED DEMONSTRATIONS IN INITIAL STAGES, HOWEVER. GP 3.
RUSSELL
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By ih, NARS, Date 2-3-86

Ken Rosen
ND 19/60 1-6
212058
4b

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

50

Origin SR

Info: SS GPM SP SC SAH L H AF EUR NEA IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA DOD AID PC ORM SCS SCA TRSY RSC

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN, BEIRUT, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, RABAT, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, Amconsul JERUSALEM

INFO: US Mission, Geneva and USUN

STATE 212058

SUBJECT: Maltreatment of Jews in Arab Countries.

1. We are disturbed by continued press and Embassy reports of violence and discrimination against Jews in Arab countries in wake of ME fighting and wish to inform you of following actions to alleviate situation:

a. UNHCR planning to send representatives to Beirut, Cairo and possible other Arab capitals to explore measures to facilitate outward movement of stateless Jewish persons to asylum countries in Europe.

b. Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) is prepared to assist with emigration processing in European asylum areas and transportation to resettlement countries. USG has authorized per capita payments to ICEM for transportation from asylum to resettlement countries.

c. AJJDC(American/Joint Jewish Distribution Committee) Executive Director told Department today that World Jewish Congress

BATOR
BOWDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENY
KOMER
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WRIGGINS

JUN 16 PM '67

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
S/R - JTAbernethy:mll 6/16	4832	James Wine

Clearances:
Clearance: NEA - Mr. Sterner IO/UNP - E. A. Brown

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM

CONFIDENTIAL

has appealed to ICRC to intervene, that the ICRC is doing so, and that American Jewish organizations are satisfied ICRC doing all it can. AJJDC also reports that Jewish agencies in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are processing Jewish persons for exit. AJJDC and HIAS (Hebrew Immigration Aid Society) have committed their funds to ICRC and UNHCR for care and maintenance and transportation of Jews who exit Arab countries.

END

MEMORANDUM

C.F. (1)

ND19/C01-CF
C0192 5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY LEVINSON

Attached is a copy of a cable from Rabat reiterating King Hassan's position of responsibilty towards the Jewish community in Morocco.

Ken Rosen

RECEIVED
JUN 23 1967
CENTRAL FILES

ND 19/CO 1-6

5c

RECEIVED
WHCA

CONFIDENTIAL

EHX670
P 161826Z JUN 67 1967 JUN 17 00 05
PP RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 14213 1672355
ZNY CCCCC ZFH-2
P R 161826Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2168
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 24
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 49
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 285
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN 87
STATE GRNC
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ RABAT 5566

1. FOLLOWING COMMENTS MAY BE OF INTEREST IN CONNECTION WITH THE GOM'S STERN WARNING AGAINST ANTI-SEMITIC ACTIVITIES AND PROPAGANDA IN MOROCCO (RABAT 5565).

2. KING HAS FOLLOWED TRADITION OF HIS FATHER IN SCRUPULOUSLY INSISTING ON TREATMENT OF MOROCCAN JEWS AS MOROCCAN CITIZENS SUBJECT TO ALL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS INHERENT IN THEIR CITIZENSHIP. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT DURING THE NAZI OCCUPATION OF FRANCE, FRENCH FASCISTS LOCALLY ATTEMPTED UNDER NAZI GUIDANCE TO EXPROPRIATE JEWISH PROPERTY, EXILE JEWS AND FINALLY TO FORCE JEWS TO WEAR YELLOW STAR OF DAVID INSIGNIA. MOHAMMED V VIGOROUSLY AND SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED FRENCH FASCIST PRESSURE, EVEN

PAGE 2 RUDK8T 5566 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
UNDER PROTECTORATE CONDITIONS. IN FACT, ON STAR OF DAVID ISSUE, HE STATED IF MOROCCAN JEWS FORCED TO WEAR STAR OF DAVID, ~~3 297)? 43173ET~~ ALL OTHER MOROCCANS TO DO LIKEWISE.

3. KING HASSAN II HAS FOLLOWED HIS FATHER'S FOOTSTEPS. AS CHERIF AND HEAD OF ISLAM, THE STATE RELIGION, AND BY VIRTUE OF THE CONSITUTION THE KING CONSIDERS IT HIS SOLEMN DUTY TO PROTECT MOROCCAN JEWS AGAINST ANY PERSECUTION OR LIMITATION OF THEIR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES. ONE OF FIRST POINTS BALAFREJ MADE TO ME DURING THE CRISIS WAS THAT HE SINCERELY HOPED WHATEVER HAPPENED MOROCCAN JEWS WOULD NOT BEEL UNEASY AND SEEK TO EMIGRATE AS MOROCCO NEEDED AND WANTED THEM. KING HAS HAD INTIMATE JEWISH ADVISERS FOR YEARS AND ONE OF TOP CIVILIANS IN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS JEWISH.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By lip, NARS, Date 2-3-86

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

4. THE ALAOUITE DYNASTY IN FACT ALL THROUGH ITS HISTORY HAS HAD CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCAN JEWS AND IT HAS BEEN STANDARD FOR ALAOUITE SULTANS TO HAVE JEWISH ADVISERS. IN PRESENT DAY MOROCCO, IT IS THE KING WHO IS REQUESTED BY THE

PAGE 3 RUDKBT 5566 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

JEWISH COMMUNITY TO APPOINT THE GRAND RABBI. IN ADDITION, ON GREAT JEWISH HOLIDAYS SUCH AS YOM KIPPUR, THE GOM OFFICIALLY CALLS ON RABBI IN SYNAGOGUE TO EXTEND BEST WISHES OF KING TO JEWISH COMMUNITY. IN THE PROVINCE OF CASABLANCA THE GOVERNOR CALLS ON THE RABBI. THIS PAST YOM KIPPUR PICTURES WERE EVEN PRODUCED IN THE PAPER SHOWING GOM MINISTERS CALLING ON THE RABBI AT YOM KIPPUR. IT IS COURAGEOUS FOR KING TO TAKE A STRONG STAND ON MOROCCAN JEWISH ISSUE AT THIS TIME. BUT, HE WOULD BETRAY HIS OWN AND HIS FATHER'S CONCEPT OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN ALAOUITE KING IF HE DID NOT DO SO.

5. THE KING DOES MADE A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN ZIONISM AND JUDAISM WHICH HE CONSIDERS TWO SEPARATE ENTITIES. ZIONISM FOR HIM IS POLITICAL AND IS A PROBLEM INVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STRONG ATTACHMENT OF ISLAM FOR THE HOLY ISLAMIC SANCTUARIES OF THE EAST.

6. IN MY VIEW THIS ATTITUDE OF KING TOWARD JEWS BOUND TO COLOR HIS THINKING ON TREATMENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE. WHILE HE MUST BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO CONTINUED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORY AND PARTICULARLY THE OCCUPATION OF THE HOLY PLACES OF ISLAM IN THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN MY VIEW THAT HASSAN II WITH ADEQUATE SUPPORT CAN BE QUITE HELPFUL IN THZF

PAGE 4 RUDKBT 5566 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

RESOLUTION OF PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. HOWEVER, HIS WILL INEVITABLY BE A COMPLETELY ARAB APPROACH WHICH WE AT TIMES MAY FIND OBSCURE AND DEVIOUS, BUT WHICH WILL INVARIABLY MAP TOWARDS THE TARGET. TASCA
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

E.F. (5)
CM/Oil
PR16
ND19/C01-6
JN3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 17, 1967
3:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Jim Langdon, of the Texas Railroad Commission, sent the attached survey of crude oil pipeline and marine terminal facilities available for current use. They consider these more than adequate to meet any demands resulting from the Middle East crisis, but they are concerned about tanker space and labor strife.

Marvin

Alice Boyce

C. F.
ND19/CO1-6

June 16, 1967

McGB:

Despite this morning's telegram from Mr. Freedman, BENJAMIN I think the prudent thing to do is to let this correspondence die right now.

Harold H. Saunders

RECEIVED
AUG 28 1967
CENTRAL FILES

The White House
Washington

1967 JUN 15 PM 4 19

WA099 PD

NF WASHINGTON DC 15 319P EDT

MCGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

THANKFUL FOR GRACIOUS INTERVIEW THIS MORNING WITH HAROLD SAUNDERS

MIDDLE EAST POLICY REFLECTING FACTS SUBMITTED ONLY GUARANTEE

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY CAN I BE OF ANY FURTHER SERVICE

BENJAMIN FREEDMAN.

15069

The White House
Washington

1967 JUN 16 AM 6 51

WA058 NL PD 8 EXTRA

NEW YORK NY 15

MCGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE

URGENT AM PREPARED RETURN WITH AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTED EVIDENCE SUPPORTING EVERY FACT PRESENTED HAROLD H SAUNDERS TODAY. UPON RETURN NEW YORK LEARNED FROM MOST RELIABLE FOREIGN CONTACTS CRISIS MORE CRITICAL THAN REALIZED WITH OMINOUS PROSPECTS NATIONAL SECURITY EXISTING TENSION RESULT SOLELY SECRET 1916 DEAL BY WHICH UNITED STATES WAS PRESSURED INTO WORLD WAR 1. GREAT BRITAIN BLACKMAILED

TO DELIVER PALESTINE AS CONSIDERATION. DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND EXCEPT FOR POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. TRUMAN RECOGNIZED KANGAROO REGIME ARMED UPRISING MINORITY TRANSPLANTED ALIENS AS SOVEREIGN STATE. NOT ONE ALIEN TRANSPLANTED FROM EASTERN EUROPE INTO PALESTINE EVER HAD ANCESTOR IN PALESTINE. PAGAN KHAZARS ASIATIC ORIGIN CONVERTED 702AD ZIONISTS PRESENCE UNITED NATIONS RESULT CARDINAL SPELLMAN LOBBYING LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN NECESSARY VOTES. CARDINAL SPELLMAN BEGGING ME FOR 6 MONTHS TO GET HIM OFF THE HOOK REALIZING BLOOD SPILLED IN PALESTINE WILL BE ON HIS HEAD. YOU CAN RENDER GREAT SERVICE OUR

FORM 0005 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

PRESIDENT BY CONSULTING ME AGAIN IN PERSON TO FORMULATE POLICY CONSISTENT AND COMPATIBLE SECURITY AND SURVIVAL. YOUR TELEGRAM WILL BRING ME TO WASHINGTON UPON RECEIPT. OUR PRESIDENT DESERVES BETTER FATE THAN TO GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS VICTIM OF ZIONIST PERFIDY. SINCERELY RESPECTFULLY

BENJAMIN FREEDMAN 139 EAST 63 ST NEW YORK NY 10021.

Alice Boyce

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD June 15, 1967

SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Benjamin Freedman

On 7 June Mr. Freedman called Mr. Bundy asking for an appointment. Mr. Bundy asked me to see him. Unable to reach him by telephone, I sent him a telegram, as he had suggested in his original call. I received a telephone call in response at 10:30 p. m. on June 13 and Mr. Freedman spent 45 minutes in my office this morning.

Mr. Freedman says he is a retired business man about 80. He claims to have followed closely Mid-Eastern affairs in the UN for twenty years. As a protege of Henry Morgenthau Sr. he was involved during the Wilson Administration in various Jewish activities, and has been following Zionist Affairs ever since.

He is a firm anti-Zionist, who appears to have devoted most of his spare time to documenting the case against the Zionists. He starts with the "secret deal" of 1916 whereby the Zionists purportedly agreed to press the US into war if the British Cabinet would promise Palestine to the Jews in the post-war settlement. He traces British efforts in the following twenty years to build a Jewish majority in the Palestine mandate. Finally he speaks of "armed uprising of a transplanted alien minority" in 1947 and the Zionist pressures on President Truman to recognize Israel in the first hours of its existence.

His main point is that the only legal state--to which our guarantees of territorial integrity should apply--is Palestine, not Israel. He claims that "90% of American Jews" feel the same way.

The message which he wished to leave for Mr. Bundy was: "There is no reason for the existence of Israel. There will never be peace in the Middle East as long as Israel exists. As long as the US continues to support the existence of Israel, the US will see its influence in the Middle East dwindle away to nothing. If we persist in our present policy, we are surely headed toward a grave confrontation with the Soviet Union."

I listened politely throughout. I said nothing, repeat nothing, except for polite prods to urge him through his historical presentation to the main point. In parting, I simply promised to pass on his

presentation to Mr. Bundy. He asked for time with Mr. Bundy and I said we knew where to get in touch with him if Mr. Bundy wished to see him.

He claimed to have met President Johnson when he was a Senator and to have been a life-long friend of Bernard Baruch. He is a very refined and literate gentleman. He does not appear to be unbalanced but he is clearly a man with a mission, and I did not try at all to discuss these matters with him.

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Bromley Smith

The White House
Washington

1967 JUN 15 AM 8 04

XWA053 RX T PD 4 EXTRA

NEWYORK NY 15 618A EDT

HAROLD H SAUNDERS, CARE MCGEORGE BUNDY

THE WHITE HOUSE EXECUTIVE OFFICES ROOM 372A

ARRIVING YOUR OFFICE ELEVEN OCLOCK THIS MORNING PURSUANT YOUR

TELEGRAM

BENJAMIN FREEDMAN 139 EAST 63 ST.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE		DATE	RESTRICTION
cable	re: Middle East Situation [attachment to 6/16/67 memo to McGB from Harold H. Saunders] secret sanitized 8-29-91 NLJ 91-205	1 p	06/15/67	A

FILE LOCATION

WHCF, Confidential File
ND 19/CO 1-6 Middle East Crisis

Box 70

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

SANITIZED

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 JUN 15 05 29

1-28 AM 6-15-67 LRC
TO: THE PRESIDENT 001
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE 002
TO: DIRECTOR, CIA 001
TO: DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 001
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

SECRET -- NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT

GP-1

END AND HOLD FOR S PLS

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-205
By ___, NARA, Date 8-29-91

June 14, 1967

Mr. Benjamin Freedman
139 East 63rd Street
New York, N. Y.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy has asked me to respond to your recent telephone call. I would be delighted to talk with you on the telephone at your convenience or to see you any time you are in Washington. I am working directly with Mr. Bundy and would be pleased to hear any thoughts you may have. Since I have been unable to reach you on the phone, I hope this telegram will reach you.

Harold H. Saunders

C. F. 6 (3)
ND19/C01-6
C0164
C0304
C0126

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY LEVINSON

Attached is a cable from Libya reporting a U.S. official's conversation with the Libyan official regarding the status of Jewish residents in Lybia.

No Americans of Jewish faith has been placed in jeopardy because of the situation in the Mid-East. However, twenty-nine Jewish service men have been asked to leave Libya (Wheelus Air Base) because of the tenseness of the situation.

The cable referenced was sent to you yesterday.

Ken Rosen

NND 19/CO1-6

6K

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Authority NLJ 86-23

By ___, NARS, Date 2-3-86

85
Action

SS
Info

012048

1967 JUN 14 PM 1 26

NNNNCZCZCGMA499
RR RUDTCR RSTHC
DE RUQMTI 0092 1651645
ZNY CCCCC
R 141630Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TRIPOLI 0092

LIMDIS

REFERENCE: TRIPOLI 091

1. DURING CALL TODAY (JUNE 14) ON MOHAMMAD MANSOURI (A BERBER) WHO IS PM'S MINISTERIAL DEPUTY IN TRIPOLI DURING PRESENT CRISIS, I TOOK OCCASION STATE THERE WERE APPARENTLY RUMORS ABROAD IN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES CONCERNING LARGE SCALE ACTIONTXAINST JEWISH RESIDENTS LIBYA INCLUDING KILLINGS. KNOADNG GOVERNMENT'S KEEN INTEREST IN PRESERVING LAW AND ORDER AND REFLECTING THIS IMAGE ABROAD, I ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY FACTS I COULD REPORT TO MY GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD PUT MATTER IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE. WHILE WE HAD NO CITIZENS DIRECTLY AFFECTED, WE WERE NATURALLY CONCERNED AT INDISCRIMINATY ACTIONS AGAINST ANY MINORITY.

2. SUBSTANCE MANSOURI'S REPLY CONTAINED REFTEL. IT CONFIRMS WHAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED FROM HEAD TRIPOLITANIAN SECURITY FORCE AND FROM FRENCH AND IATALIAN EMBASSIES.

3. BELIEVE IT MOST IMPORTANT MOVE DISCREETLY SET RECORD STRAIGHT. JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, SITUATION REMAINS EXTEMELY TENSE. FURTHER OUTSIDE ACTION AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AND MIGHT ONLY EMBARRASS AND TIE HANDS AUTHORITIES WHO ARE MOVING QUIETLY BUT CINSCIENTIOUSLY PROTECT COMMUNITY.

4. NO AMERICAN OF JEWISH FAITH HAS BEEN PLACED IN JEOPARDY, BUT 29 AF PERSONNEL OF JEWISH FAITH AT WHEELUS HAVE ASKED TO DEPART BECAUSE OF CURRENT AIMOSPHERE AND AIR FORCE GRANTING REQUEST. NEWSOM
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

_BATOR
_BOWDLER
_BUDGET
_DAVIS
_GINSBURGH
_HAMILTON
_JESSUP
_JOHNSON
_JORDEN
_KEENY
_KOMER
_MOYERS
_TAYLOR
_WRIGGINS

S
VP

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~Memo~~	To Joseph Califano from Ken Rosen ~~Confidential~~ open 3-11-86 NLJ 86-22 ~~1 p~~ [attachment to: memo w/attachments Ken Rosen to Larry Levinson re cable from Libya re status of Jewish residents in Libya dated 6/17/67]	~~06/14/67~~	A

FILE LOCATION

C.F. ND 19/CO 1-6 Middle/Near East Crisis
Box 70

RESTRICTION CODES

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

6-b

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH CALIFANO

THROUGH: LARRY LEVINSON

Enclosed is a cable from the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya. The Libyan officials, although caught by surprise, are apparently trying to protect the lives and property of the Jewish population in the country.

Please note paragraph 5 which places controls upon informing public media of exchange between our officials and Government of Libya officials.

Ken Rosen
Executive Officer
to Mr. Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-22
By ___, NARS, Date 3-11-86

CENTRAL FILES
JUN 8 1967
RECEIVED

EHX465
OO RUENEX
DE RUEHC 12020 1551358
ZNY CCCCC ZFH2
O 141623Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUDTOR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 195 IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1212 IMMEDIATE
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 98
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 16
RUEHDT/US MISSION U.N. 29
STATE GRNC
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TRIPOLI 0091

CONFIDENTIAL

ND 19/CD 1-6
6C

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 JUN 14 18 29

REFERENCE: LONDON 10346K

1. YOU MAY INFORM OFFICIALS JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS ON SELECTIVE BASIS THAT FROM BEGINNING PRESENT CRISIS EMBASSY HAS NOTED SERIOUS CONCERN ON PART GOL SECURITY AUTHORITIES FOR SAFETY ESTIMATED 4000 JEWISH PERSONS IN TRIPOLI. RIOTS WHICH ERUPTED SUDDENLY ON JUNE 5 CAUGHT GOL SECURITY AUTHORITIES BY SURPRISE AND THERE WAS EXTENSIVE WRECKING, LOOTING, AND BURNING OF SHOPS AND HOMES IN WHICH TRIPOLI JEWISH COMMUNITY SUSTAINED EXTENSIVE MATERIAL DAMAGE. WHEN ORDER WAS RESTORED NEXT DAY, TRIPOLI SECURITY AUTHORITIES EVACUATED

PAGE 2 RUQMTI 0091 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
TO ARMY BARRACKS OUTSIDE TRIPOLI ESTIMATED 200JEWS WHO HAD LOST HOMES, AND PLACED GUARDS ON HOMES OF ALL OTHERS, SUGGESTING THEY REMAIN INSIDE FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY. THOSE IN TOWN REMAIN FEARFUL FOR LIFE. EVACUATED JEWS BEING FED BY GOL. BETWEEN JUNE 5 AND JUNE 13, ACCORDING HIGHEST GOL SECURITY AUTHORITY, THERE HAVE BEEN TWO AUTHENTICATED DEATHS JEWISH RESIDENTS; TWO OTHERS OF PERSONS MISTAKEN FOR JEWS.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By mp, NARS, Date 2-3-86

2. IN VIEW GREAT CONFUSION SURROUNDING EVENTS JUNE 5 THROUGH 7 AND EXTREME SENSITIVITY SUBJECT, DIFFICULT OBTAIN FURTHER AKRD INFORMATION. WE HAVE NO BASIS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE ANY LARGE SCALE ANTI-EWISH ACTIVITIES JUNE 12 OR 13.

3. WE HAVE LESS HARD INFORMATION ON BENGHAZI, WHERE JEWISH COMMUNITY RELATIVELY SMALL AND WHERE FULL ORDER RETURNING MORE SLOWLY. THERE WAS EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO JEWISH, AS WELL AS BRITISH AND AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENTS, BUT NO KNOWN DEATHS.

4. FRENCH AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN REPRESENTATIONS TO GOL AND IN ARRANGING EVACUATION JEWS

THESE NATIONALTIES.

5. FYI - REFERENCES IN DISCUSSIONS TO ACTIONS LIBYAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY CAUTION REGARDING XSSQ US THIS REFERENCE IN ANY PUBLIC MEDIA. GOL AUTHORITIES ARE UNDER GREAT POLITICAL PRESSURE AS RESULT THEIR MODERATE ATTITUDE IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND ANY PUBLIC DISCUSSIONLTHEIR ROLE COULD RESULT IN EMBARRASSMENT TO THEM AND POSSIBLE INCREASED DANGER JEWISH COMMUNITY. QUESTION USE WHEELUS HAS NOT ARISEN SINCE GOL AUTHROITIES HAVE ARRANGED SAFEHAVEN. SERIOUS CURRENT PRESSURES ON BASE, HOWEVER, MAKE IT UNLIKELY WE OR COOPERATING GOL AUTHORITIES WOULD WISH USE IT AS SAFE HAVEN FOR ANY NON-AMERICANS. END FYI.

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWSOM
BT

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-205
By MP, NARA, Date 8-29-91

SANITIZED

Mr. Watson
C. F.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(F)

RECEIVED
WHCA
1967 JUN 14 19 07

ND 19/CO1-6
CO303
CO232
CO190

3 02 PM 6-14-67 HL
TO: THE PRESIDENT 002
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE 003
TO: DIRECTOR CIA002
TO: DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 002
FROM DIRECTOR FBI

(~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION) MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT

END PAGE ONE

PAGE TWO

GP-1
END . HOLD FOR ACKS

C. F.
FG 6-1/IT
ND 19/CO 1-6
IT 4-2-6
FG 115
FG 105

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 13, 1967
11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Arthur Goldberg
Secretary Robert McNamara
Under Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach

SUBJECT: Cabinet Meeting, 12:00 noon, June 14, 1967, Wednesday

As my office called your office early this morning, the President would like a discussion of the ramifications of the Near East military operation crisis for the Cabinet Meeting and would like the three of you to participate.

He understands, of course, that Ambassador Goldberg may not be available because of the necessity of staying in New York in relation to the operation of the Security Council.

But I did want to confirm that he would like the Cabinet to be given the background concerning the diplomatic and military crisis in the Near East. He would like to confine the discussion to 20 minutes.

Robert E. Kintner
Secretary to the Cabinet

Original memos to each addressee

REK:gt

RECEIVED
JUN 14 1967
CENTRAL FILES

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By JL On 10-78

C. F. (2)

FG 100/MC

ND 19/CO1-6.

June 13, 1967
12:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I think it would be appropriate to invite McGeorge Bundy to the Cabinet Meeting tomorrow since the Near East is to be discussed.

Is this O.K.? Yes_____ No_____

Robert E. Kintner

REK:gt

RECEIVED
JUN 14 1967
CENTRAL FILES

White

C. F. 5
CO126
ND19/CO1-6
HU4
FG216

June 7, 1967
Wednesday, 7:45 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Larry Levinson
Ben Wattenberg

We talked to David Brody of the Anti-Defamation League of the Binai B'rith, and he reported this reaction from the Jewish community in America:

Monday there was sharp disillusion and dismay at the McCloskey statement concerning "neutrality in word, thought, and deed." The row-back by Secretary Rusk did not fully catch up with the original statement -- certainly not among the Jewish rank-and-file (who hissed at a Union meeting in New York Monday when the "neutrality" statement was announced.) The Jewish leadership understands that the statement was not your policy, but they feel that it did indicate to them a real feeling in the State Department -- that Israel was just another country on the map and that there was little concern for the humanity of the situation there.

On the other hand, they are pleased so far with the American position in the U.N. regarding the cease-fire, and the fact that no withdrawal was stipulated, and, of course, they are highly pleased with the military turn of events.

The major concern today among Jewish leaders now is this: that Israel, apparently having won the war, may be forced to lose the peace -- again (as in 1956). They were concerned that the U.N. would attempt to sell Israel down the river -- and that only the U.S. could prevent that. Today, that is what American Jews are looking to the President for: assurances of a real, guaranteed, meaningful peace in the Middle East, and that Israel not be forced to a roll-back as they were by the Dulles-Eisenhower position in 1956.

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By SF On 9-16-76

White

THE LEGAL ADVISER
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Cy given to Ramsey Clark ⑥

C. F.
ND19/CO1-6
FO3-2
FG105
FG135
FO8
IT47-20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

June 6, 1967

Dear Joe:

I am enclosing with this note a copy of a memorandum I prepared yesterday for Secretary Rusk on the subject of neutrality and belligerency, which you and Ramsey Clark discussed with him yesterday afternoon.

Yours sincerely,

Leonard C. Meeker

Enclosure:

As stated.

The Honorable
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
Special Assistant to
the President.

RECEIVED
AUG 6 1968
CENTRAL FILES

7a

ND 19/CO1-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 5, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By ___, NARS, Date 2-3-86

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: L - Leonard C. Meeker LCM

SUBJECT: "War", "Belligerent Rights", and "Neutrality" in the Near East Conflict -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Background

States engaged in current hostilities in the Near East have variously and at different times asserted that they were "at war", in a state of "belligerency", or had "belligerent rights". For example, Israel asserted belligerent rights against Egypt even at the conclusion of the Suez conflict in 1956 and early 1957. Egypt, for its part, claimed belligerent rights as early as 1951. On May 23, 1967, a Cairo announcement stated: "There is a state of war between us and Israel". During the current hostilities one or more of the Arab States and Israel may make comparable statements or issue formal declarations of war.

Discussion

The legal significance of any such assertions or declarations is to be determined, not according to the intention of the asserting or declaring State, but in accordance with the prescriptions of the United Nations Charter concerning the lawfulness of the use of armed force. In other words, a country resorting to force lawfully -- for example, in self-defense against armed attack -- would be entitled to exercise legal rights

comparable to the rights of a belligerent under traditional international law. During the Korean War the United States took the position that the forces of a country participating in the United Nations Command pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council were entitled to assert and exercise belligerent rights. We did not recognize any such rights as belonging to the North Korean aggressors.

In the current Near East conflict not all the facts are known. It may be established later that Israel initiated the current fighting, and did so in a coordinated fashion so as to gain the advantage of pre-emptive strikes. Israel could, of course, argue that there was provocation for this action: such as terrorist raids on Israel, the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, etc. We might reach the legal conclusion that Israel's resort to force early this morning was unjustified and not lawful under the Charter. From this would follow the conclusion that the UAR and other Arab States attacked were entitled to assert and exercise rights similar to those of belligerents, and also the conclusion that Israel had no such rights. However, we may prefer for a variety of reasons not to make this kind of judgment at the present time, or indeed at any time. We may prefer simply to concentrate on a cessation of hostilities, to be followed by the negotiation of some hopefully stable settlement.

If we reserve judgment on the lawfulness of the use of force in the current hostilities, this does not entail the United States assuming a position of "neutrality", as that concept was understood and applied in international law before the United Nations Charter. The United States is simply a non-participant in the conflict; the United States is a United Nations Member and permanent member of the Security Council concerned to bring the hostilities to an end and to restore international peace and security in the area.

So far as concerns aid and assistance to States engaged in the Near East conflict, the United States would be entitled to participate in collective self-defense of a country attacked. Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. Measures of defense must be necessary to repel the attack and proportionate to it. A defender does not enjoy a legal right to conquer or annihilate the aggressor.

Assistance to the attacker would present more difficult questions. We could not lawfully provide assistance to the aggressor through the use of our armed forces or through the supply of military equipment after the outbreak of hostilities, thus associating the United States with the military operations of the attack. More difficult questions would arise in regard to providing financial assistance, or food, to the aggressor. Any such action would have to be examined with great care in the light of all the circumstances. Similarly, we should approach questions of assistance with great caution in any situation where we were unclear as to who was the aggressor and who the victim.

American nationals on the territory of participants in the conflict are neither "neutrals" nor "enemies". They are entitled to be treated as the citizens of a friendly nation with which the host country is at peace.

So far as concerns the operation of any U.S. statutes concerning neutrality, this would depend on decisions and proclamations by the President.

L:LCMeeker:jsf

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

June 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR Messrs. Rusk, McNamara and Califano.

Attached is a brief description of the provisions of the Neutrality Act.

Ramsey Clark
Attorney General

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

Re: Neutrality Act

The Neutrality Act of 1939 (54 Stat. 4, 22 U.S.C. 441-457), now in force, provides in section 1 (22 U.S.C. 441) that whenever the President, or Congress by concurrent resolution, finds (1) that a state of war exists between foreign states, and (2) that it is necessary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or protect the lives of American citizens, the President shall issue a proclamation naming the States involved.

Upon the issuing of such a proclamation by the President it shall be unlawful to do the following:

(1) For any American citizen to travel on a vessel of any State named in the proclamation (except in accordance with rules and regulations as may be prescribed (22 U.S.C. 445);

(2) For any person in the United States to deal in any securities of the government of any State named in the proclamation, or to make loans or credits to any such government. (22 U.S.C. 447);

(3) For any person in the United States to solicit or receive any contribution on behalf of the government of any such State. However, contributions for medical and humanitarian purposes are exempt if made on behalf of and for use by any person or organization not acting on behalf of any such government (22 U.S.C. 448).

Violation of the above provisions is a criminal offense (22 U.S.C. 447(c), 455).

The Act also provides for restrictions on the use of American ports by any vessel, domestic or foreign, which the President has reason to believe is about to engage in the carriage of arms, men, munitions, or information to any warship of a State named in the neutrality proclamation (22 U.S.C. 450). The President may further deny the use of American ports and territorial waters to the submarines or armed vessels of any foreign nation if necessary to maintain peace between the United States and foreign States, and he makes a proclamation to that effect (22 U.S.C. 451).

Under the Foreign Assistance Act, the President may waive the effects of a Neutrality Act proclamation with respect to transactions under the military assistance program. (22 U.S.C.

2393(b)). Thus, the President would have the power to permit private credit sales of military items covered by the Foreign Assistance Act to a government named in a proclamation.

The Security Council,

Noting the oral report of the Secretary General in this situation,

having heard the statements made in the Council,

concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

(1) calls upon the governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area,

(2) request, the Secretary General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

DPC 106

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS BRIEFING, MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1967, 12:48 P.M.

MR. McCLOSKEY: In view of the outbreak of hostilities in the area, United States citizens desiring to go to the following countries must, until further notice, obtain passports specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel.

Q Hold it just a minute. Pardon me. What's after "further notice"?

A Must, until further notice, obtain passports specifically endorsed by the Department of State for such travel: Lebanon, United Arab Republic, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Sudan.

All outstanding passports, except those of United States citizens remaining in those countries, are being declared invalid for travel there, unless specifically endorsed for such travel.

Now, we contemplate that exceptions to these regulations will be granted to persons whose travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously established business interests. Permanent resident aliens cannot travel to those countries unless special permission is obtained for this purpose through the United States Immigration and Naturalization Servic[illegible]

I'll make that the subject of an official press release after the briefing.

Q Is that 14 countries, Bob? I just want to check the number.

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Now, I know -- I realize that there are a great number of questions that you have. I shall not be in a position, I know, to answer all of them. You have all seen the statement issued by the White House, which is the official posture of the United State Government as a result of these developments early this morning.

Those of you who were here earlier have been told in general who was in the Department and roughly at what time. Since then, there have been a number of Ambassadors from various of the countries in -- specifically, Ambassadors or representatives of Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Sudan.

Now, this group met with Under Secretary Rostow --

Q As a group?

A Yes --and Assistant Secretaries Battle and Palmer at 10:30 this morning. Shortly before 10 a.m., the Charge d'Affaire of the Israeli Embassy was in and saw Mr. Rostow. The French Ambassador was scheduled to see Mr. Rostow at 11:30. So that there's been a considerable amount of diplomatic activity here throughout the morning.

In general in these meetings, it has been emphasized that the United States has done its utmost, both inside and outside the United Nations, to forestall an outbreak of hostilities.

Earlier on we had, over the last week - 10 days,

made our position clear separately, and especially the United Arab Republic and Israel, in cautioning against firing of the first shot.

To repeat the obvious, we deeply regret in this Government that hostilities have broken out.

Q Bob, Ambassador Kamel, who was speaking for the Arab Group, told us when he came out from Rostow that Rostow requested a cease-fire. Can you comment on that?

A I cannot confirm it. I didn't get into the details of the discussion to that extent, but that certainly is the wish of this Government and you can assume will be stated repeatedly by the various officials of the Government.

Q Now, you spoke about the first -- who fired the first shot. Well, who did; do you know?

A No.

Q Bob, did we have any advance warning that hostilities would break out last night?

A No. So far as I can judge, the first reports that hostilities had erupted were in press reports reaching the Department. Shortly thereafter,

our capitals came along with a -- with their reports. Again, to say the obvious, the situation --

Q What time there?

A -- is quite unclear.

Sorry.

Q What time was the first official report?

A Our first official report was received, I think, at 2:25 a.m.

Q You said that you had talked earlier about the movements of some of the officials, Bob. Not all of us are aware of this. Could you just repeat it?

A Well, the Secretary came in at about 4:00 a.m. Mr. Rostow was here, I think, about the same time -- perhaps a little earlier. Down the line people were arriving at the Department roughly from 3:00 o'clock on. Under Secretary Katzenbach was here very early also. The policy officials of the -- especially the Bureaus of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and African Affairs also were here early.

Q Bob, are there any documents in existence,

not counting Sullivan and Cromwell memo pads, setting forth the commitment of the United States and guaranteeing the bombing in the Near East?

A Well, I think the most authoritative statement is the statement of the President on May 23rd.

Q There are no documents?

A Well, I don't know and can't recall everything that is on the record, but that has been perused here repeatedly since the tension first arose in the area; but --

Q Bob --

A -- I am in no position to speak specifically beyond the President's statement of May 23rd.

Q Do you have any reports of death or injury of any Americans in the fighting so far?

A I hope you can appreciate that a great amount of our information is somewhat fragmentary, incomplete; but there have been demonstrations against and damage to various U. S. Missions in Libya, the Embassy Office in Benghazi. There were demonstrations resulting from 10 American officials taking refuge in

a secure area in the office. The USIS Center, also in Benghazi, was seriously damaged. In Tripoli, the Embassy was stoned. In Iraq, at Baghdad: demonstration and damage to the Embassy. Also Basra in Iraq: the American Consulate damaged. Demonstrations reported in Khartoum against the American Embassy; no report of damage presently. In Syria at Damascus, the USIS Cultural Center damaged. In The Yemen, at the Embassy in Sana'a, demonstrations. In Tunisia, the Embassy at Tunis, again demonstrations; no report of damage.

There is an unconfirmed report that some airmen, some American airmen, were assaulted in Tripoli.

Q Are these U. S. Air Force or civilian?

A My information is that they are airmen -- which would mean U. S. Air Force.

We have a report that an NBC producer or director was injured in Jerusalem.

That's the beginning and end of information I have presently in this general subject.

Q Bob, many of these countries involved in this present situation are recipients of U. S. aid, either military or economic. What steps are being taken

on our aid, if any?

A All programs are urgently under review.

Q Would it -- in the eventuality that something does pop on the aid side, Bob, it would be awfully useful to have a rundown of the amount of aid to the different countries.

A Well, there is the green book in my office, which is as up-to-date as anything that I can otherwise turn up.

Q Bob, would you say it's likely aid would be suspended?

A I wouldn't anticipate anything at this point. If there's anything to be added to what I said, we'd be glad to get it for you.

Q What plans do we have for evacuation and how will it be done for American citizens?

A Well, I would expect that there would be continued evacuation in the countries where we have already discussed this -- that is, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and in the two halves of Jerusalem -- probably also in, and I go ON BACKGROUND here -- Lebanon, all Ambassadors, all Chiefs of Mission in these countries

in the area have discretionary authority.

Transport may be a difficulty. I am not able to confirm at this point that any U. S. official transport has been laid on or arranged. If that happens, we'll get that to you.

Q Bob, as to travel plans, do you still expect high officials in the UAR to arrive in Washington and when do you expect Ambassador Thompson to go back to Moscow?

A Well, we had expected the Vice President of Egypt to come here, possibly sometime this week. It appears now that his trip, by his own decision or his government's decision, will be postponed. We regret that. We had looked forward to seeing him. It is my understanding we've been told that the visit has not been cancelled but postponed --

Q Was there --

A -- in which case he would be welcome at any time.

Q Did you invite him?

aac
"B" sec. follows

B Sec., elk
(fls. aac)

A I do not -- I have not heard anything about Ambassador Thompson. I talked to him this morning. I didn't get the impression that he was returning immediately.

There are two of our Ambassadors here who have been here for consultation; that is, David D. Newsom, Libya; and Francis H. Russell, Tunisia. Now, these are returning to their post immediately.

Sir?

Q Were the Egyptians invited by the American Government, or did they just announce that they would like to come here?

A It was mutually agreed, and felt desirable.

Q Bob, for the record, these demonstrations obviously are linking the U. S. with Israel. The U. S. position in the U. N. has been stated as being neutral. Would you reaffirm that?

A Indeed, I would; I would be more than happy to. We have tried to steer an even-handed course through this. Our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed.

Q When did you learn that the U. A. R.

Vice President would postpone his trip?

A Some time this morning.

Q Were you meeting as late as last night on his trip?

A No. There were no special meetings on that.

Q Bob, on the travel ban, the reason, as given at the start, is "In view of the outbreak of hostilities in the area ...."

A I hear you.

Q By that, you mean the legal fact, the declaration of war; or the dangers to the citizens? I ask this because when it comes to evacuation, you are referring only to five countries in the immediate danger zone, and not including those farther out in Africa.

A Well, I thought I had indicated ON BACKGROUND that there will, I fully expect, be additional countries from which American official dependents, first, will probably be assisted in departing--evacuated, if you like. But I wasn't trying to be exclusive in any sense. Now, I am advised that the outbreak of armed

hostilities does present the Department with discretionary authority in this respect. To satisfy the record, we will publish notice to this effect in the Federal Register.

Q Are you advising Americans to leave in the areas of the 14; as you have in the five?

A Well, that should certainly be implicit in what we have said here. The answer, specifically, is "Yes."

Q Do you have an approximation of the number of Americans in all 14 countries?

A No.

We could consult the Foreign Service List for you for officials, but I think it's too much to expect that we would know, in any educated way, a round figure for the number of Americans in as many as 14 countries.

Q Bob, now that that is a war zone, will any special instructions be given to American shipping at sea?

A I have heard of no discussion of that this morning. I am not trying to make "never" statements here; if you can accept two negatives. Obviously, decisions will be taken, as they are required; as events proceed.

Q Bob, more specifically, Secretary Brown, in the House of Commons, today said British Merchant vessels have been advised to avoid the Suez Canal Zone. Has this Government taken similar measures?

A I have seen nothing in that connection yet.

Q Bob, I am a little confused on this question of making passports invalid for these countries. Do you have the list of the, I think it was three, criteria -- isn't it? -- the Government follows on this, that we could have?

The reason I ask was my previous understanding was the Government had to consider the hostilities virtually imminent in a place before they did this; which would put them on record as considering hostilities virtually imminent in a terrifically wide area. Now I may be confused about the criteria; that's why I ask.

A Well, why don't I try to get that for you, since it is a legal matter, and I wouldn't want to try to offhand it here.

Q Bob, Kamel also said that in addition to a French tanker -- I am quoting him -- which Israel has

tried to sink in the Suez Canal -- "maybe another American tanker" was also attacked by the Israelis. Do you have any knowledge of this?

A No.

There was a report earlier this morning that an American tanker had -- What?

Q "Broached"?

A -- slewed in the Canal. I found no confirmation of that. In fact, FOR BACKGROUND, so far as I am aware there is no American shipping presently in the Canal.

Q Bob, have you had any word about Pan American oil properties in the Gulf of Suez being in danger?

A No; not specifically, Ed. We did take the occasion, in meeting with these Ambassadors here this morning, to say that we would look to their governments to prevent damage to American property and injury to American citizens. I know of nothing specifically on Pan Am.

Q Bob, have we made an effort today, either here or in Moscow, to get through to the

Russians on this situation?

A We are in contact with all appropriate governments, including -- if I may put it this way -- the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Q Bob, you said -- Have you finished?

A Yes, sir.

Q -- you said a moment ago that our position is one of neutrality in word, thought, and deed -- did you not?

A [indicated affirmatively]

Q Do you feel we can continue to maintain a neutral position, no matter what happens in the Middle East?

A That will be our effort.

Q Bob, there are suggestions out of London for a Four-Power Conference on this crisis. Has the British Government been in consultation with us on such a step?

A No.

I saw that report, and I find nothing parallel to it here. I may have neglected to note that the British Ambassador, also, was in this morning at nine o'clock. I am not aware of any consultation within that

framework.

Q Bob, when the Ambassadors were talking in the Department today were they told that the United States would continue to maintain a neutral effort, if possible?

A Yes. I would certainly assume so. I don't know whether specifically those words were used in the conversations, but, certainly, the whole atmosphere of the presentation was in that context.

Q Bob, have we been informed by the Russians as to what their attitude is to the French proposal for a Four-Power Meeting?

A FOR BACKGROUND, I could not say that we have officially. That is a matter between the Soviet Government and the French Government. I myself have not seen anything government to government on that.

Q Is it your understanding that the Soviet stance on that proposal is still open?

A I would refrain from offering any understanding on it, because I could be proved wrong. I should think your best sources are the French and the Soviets.

Q Bob, would the financing of one of the

belligerents through U. S. bonds be a violation of our position of neutrality?

[Laughter]

A Well, that presumes something that I am, first of all, not familiar with, and, therefore, may draw an inappropriate answer. I would, FOR BACKGROUND, say that politically the answer is "No."

Q What do you mean "politically"?

A [Silence]

Q Thank you.

Q Bob, could you tell us on these special authorizations for the passports -- does this go into effect immediately, or after publication in the Federal Register.

A Well, this is an official announcement here, and for all practical purposes it is in effect as of now. We will satisfy the record by publishing it in the Federal Register.

Q Bob, in view of our neutrality, may one assume that we have dropped this idea of a declaration by maritime powers to open the Strait of Tiran and Aqaba Gulf?

A I would have to look into that. I just

didn't get brought up to date on that this morning.

Q Bob, there were reports over the week-end that the Israeli Government had requested gas masks from this country. Can you confirm this?

A Yes, sir. I confirmed it Saturday.

Q What is the present status of that request?

A We have sold a certain number to them. We have a request before us now for an additional number. And again, FOR BACKGROUND, I would assume that will be satisfied.

Q You think that will be satisfied?

A I think so.

Q Bob, do you consider the reply that was sent to the Soviet Union on the shipping allegation, bombing allegation in Campha -- is this now a closed matter, or is it still alive diplomatically?

A There has been no reply officially from the Soviet Government since our note was handed to them on Saturday; so I would just leave it at that.

Q Bob, would you assume that this question of shipping additional gas masks would become involved in the whole question of military aid?

A Well, then, perhaps, I should retract my assumption, if it is cast in those terms. So I will, with your permission, withdraw that assumption; take the question, and get something better for you than my assumption.

Q In this connection, Bob, do you know whether American military aid to the countries of the Middle East continues?

A I said that these --

Q If I missed it, I am sorry.

A -- I said that these programs are under urgent review at this time.

Q Under urgent review.

Q Bob, how do you make sure that all officials are neutral in thought?

Q If that's the last question, let's go.

Q Thank you very much.

1:17 p.m.

- - -

B Sec.,
LS:elk

C. F.

2198
(3)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

ND 19/CO1-6
PR8-2/1A-1 ne
FG105

9682

June 5 1967

To be answered by State

B(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Arab-American Group Requests Appointment with the President to discuss the Middle East

The enclosed message from Dr. M. T. Mehdi, Secretary General of the Action Committee on American Arab Relations, requests an appointment with President Johnson to discuss the current crisis in the Middle East. Dr. Mehdi is not the most reputable of pro-Arab spokesmen in the U.S., but if the President does intend to receive a group of Zionist leaders in the near future, we recommend that Mehdi and his group be received by a member of the White House staff. If such an appointment is approved, the Department will inform Dr. Mehdi of the time and date.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Message to the President
from Dr. M. T. Mehdi.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 86-23
By ___, NARS, Date 2-3-86

VIA LDX

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOS/S Mrs. Read

For urgent recommendation

BICS

SENT
5 JUNE 1967
3:15 PM

The White House
Washington

1967 JUN 3 PM 8 35

WD058 DL PD

NEW YORK NY E 203P EDT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

25 LEADERS OF AMERICAN ARAB COMMUNITY REPRESENTING ONE MILLION AMERICAN ARABS WISH TO MEET WITH YOU TO DISCUSS MIDEAST CRISIS AMERICAN ARABS ARE COMING TO WASHINGTON WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY 7TH AND 8TH JUNE FOR MEETINGS AND ALLIES WE WANT MEETING WITH YOU PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF REPORTS THAT ZIONIST JEWISH LEADERS PLAN MEETING YOU WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY

DR M T MEHDI SECRETARY GENERAL THE ACTION COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN ARAB RELATIONS 441 LEXINGTON AVE NEW YORK NY.

FORM 0809 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

THROUGH: The Honorable
Robert E. Kintner
The White House

When the King of Morocco visited you on February 9-10, 1967, you discussed generally an extension of the existing agreement for the use of VOA transmitting facilities at Tangier. Details were to be worked out by the Foreign Minister with us.

Since that time we have endeavored to confirm this arrangement but have made little progress. I have now received an invitation from the Foreign Minister to confer with him at Rabat and believe that it would be highly desirable to do so following my meeting in Bonn, Germany. I estimate that two days would be required for this purpose.

The Tangier plant is particularly important to us at the present time in light of the Middle East crisis and I am anxious to resolve any outstanding problems which might limit our future use of these facilities.

Leonard H. Marks

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
JUN 3 1967
CENTRAL FILES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority USICA 10-3-81 ceNLJ 81-166
By DCH, NARS, Date 2-9-82

C.F. (5)
FG100/MC
ND19/C01-6
FG105
FG110
LE
FG175

Received Washington CommCen:
13:44 P.M. 29 MAY 1967

Received LBJ CommCen:
14:45 P.M. 29 MAY 1967

EEA065
00 WTE10
DE WTE 1085

FROM ROBERT KINTNER
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70286

UNCLAS

MAY 29, 1967
2:00 P.M. MONDAY

MR. PRESIDENT:

FOLLOWING IS A SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR THE CABINET MEETING ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 31, AT NOON:

1. SECRETARY RUSK HAS SUGGESTED THAT HE COULD GIVE A SHORT BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

   YES-✓---- NO----- 15 MINUTES

2. LARRY O'BRIEN IS PREPARED TO GIVE HIS USUAL REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM.

   YES-✓---- NO----- 15 MINUTES

3. SECRETARY BOYD FEELS THAT A DISCUSSION ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE RAILROAD STRIKE LEGISLATION WOULD BE OF GENERAL INTEREST TO THE CABINET AND OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE PRESIDENT.

   YES-✓---- NO ---- 10 MINUTES

THIS WOULD GIVE A TOTAL OF 40 MINUTES.

4. ALL MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SECRETARY FREEMAN, WILL BE PRESENT. (AS THE PRESIDENT MAY RECALL, HE HAS GIVEN SECRETARY FREEMAN PERMISSION TO BE IN THE MIDWEST AT A POLITICAL RALLY.) IF THE PRESIDENT APPROVES, UNDER SECRETARY JOHN SCHNITTKER WILL ATTEND.

   YES-✓---- NO-----

5. WHOM OF THE FOLLOWING WOULD THE PRESIDENT LIKE TO ATTEND THE CABINET MEETING?

   GOVERNOR BRYANT YES-✓--- NO-----

   DIRECTOR SCHULTZE YES-✓---- NO-----

EEA053
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1072

Received Washington CommCen
8:51 P.M. Sunday 28 May 67

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
9:33 P.M. Suncay 28 May 67

C. F.

ND19/CO1-6
ND19/CO312
FG115

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67473

CONFIDENTIAL

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SEN. JAVITS, Jacob K. SAW SECRETARY MCNAMARA THIS AFTERNOON. HE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT WE HAD THE FORCES AVAILABLE TO DEAL WITH BOTH VIET-NAM AND WHATEVER MIGHT NEED TO BE DONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

HE THEN CALLED ON ME AT ABOUT 9 P.M. IN MY OFFICE.

HE ELABORATED HIS PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING WITH "DEEPLY CONCERNED" MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS AS FOLLOWS.

1. IT WOULD CONSIST OF 4-6 MEMBERS OF THE SENATE ORGANIZED BY HIM AND 6-8 MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE ORGANIZED BY MANNY CELLER.

2. THE GROUP WOULD COME NOT LIKE THE LEADERSHIP TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS FOR ACTION BUT TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AND TO HEAR THE PRESIDENT'S GENERAL ATTITUDE. HE SAYS SUCH MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH PARTICULARLY "CONCERNED" MEMBERS HAVE TAKEN PLACE OFTEN IN THE PAST UNDER OTHER PRESIDENTS AND ON MANY ISSUES.

3. THE GROUPS WOULD BE "CONTRIVED" SO AS TO BE BALANCED AS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES AND AS BETWEEN LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES. FOR EXAMPLE HE WOULD HOPE HICKENLOOPER WOULD COME ON THE SENATE DELEGATION. OTHERS MIGHT BE - ASIDE FROM JAVITS FROM AMONG BROOKE, PERCY, SYMINGTON, COOPER, OR CASE, R.F. KENNEDY, CLARK, PELL, RIBICOFF.

4. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT "STIR UP" A REQUEST FOR SUCH A MEETING. IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE PRESIDENT'S SENSE OF TIMING AND APPROPRIATENESS. BUT HE DOES STRONGLY RECOMMEND IT.

5. HE BELIEVES IT WOULD STABILIZE THE U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY IN THE PROTRACTED EMOTIONAL CRISIS WE FACE IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

6. AS FOR HIMSELF HE WISHES YOU TO KNOW THAT HE BELIEVES POLITICS HAS NO PLACE IN THIS CRISIS; THAT YOU HAVE PUT THE ISSUE PRECISELY RIGHT IN YOUR MAY 23 STATEMENT; IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF SUPPORTING ISRAEL BUT OF SUPPORTING CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH GO TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

DTG: 290151Z MAY 1967

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC letter 3-15-82 re NLJ 81-165
By DCH, NARS, Date 3-30-82

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
JUN 1 5 1967
CENTRAL FILES

I agree. We ought to be prepared to do it.
We'll set a date as sonn as we get back.

LBJ/JJ/mf
5-27-67
9:30p

JJ relayed to Walt Rostow

(F)

6-1-67
Action completed upon
this
JJ

VZCZCEEA036
OO WTE10
DE WTE1051

(3)

Received at Washington CommCen
5:29 P.M. SATURDAY 27 May 67

Received at LBJ Ranch CommCen
5:47 P.M. Saturday 27 May 67

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67459

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

MAY 27, 1967

SEN. JAVITS CALLED TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. I BRIEFED HIM IN VERY GENERAL TERMS.

HE THEN MADE THIS SUGGESTION: IT MIGHT BE REASSURING TO THE U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY IF YOU WERE TO HAVE IN SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WITH SPECIAL INTERESTS IN ISRAEL FOR A BRIEFING.

THERE WILL BE A BIG PRO-ISRAEL RALLY IN NEW YORK. THERE IS GREAT CONCERN. SUCH A MEETING MIGHT EASE THAT CONCERN.

HE SUGGESTED EARLY NEXT WEEK.

I MADE NO ENCOURAGING NOISE, BUT PROMISED TO INFORM YOU.

I SEE DISADVANTAGES AS WELL AS ADVANTAGES: THIS IS A QUESTION OF NATIONAL INTEREST. THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MIGHT BE THE APPROPRIATE GROUP WHEN AND IF YOU HAD SOMETHING TO REPORT.

BUT I DID WISH YOU TO KNOW OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 272229Z MAY 67

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC letter 3-15-82 NSC 81-165
By Dlt, NARS, Date 3-30-82

May 23, 1967
Tuesday - 2:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Mike Manatos

Senator Javits called at 2:15 p.m. to say that if you felt he could be of any assistance with respect to the Middle East situation he would be privileged to come in. He feels he is conversant with the views of the Jewish community, he has heard the testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee all morning, he has just come from a Republican luncheon conference which discussed the situation, he has had full information from the State Department, and he has talked to Goldberg.

Javits said that he would not impose himself on you but if you felt his counsel could be helpful he would be pleased to come in.

Yes_____

No_____

✓ Copy for Marvin Watson

C.F. (2)

FG100/MC
ND19/C01-6
FG 105

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO:
S/S-9137

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT KINTNER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cabinet Meeting (Tentative)
Wednesday, May 31

If the President wishes, Secretary Rusk will be prepared to comment briefly on the crisis in the Near East at the Cabinet meeting.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

S/S:HBThompson:sbb
5/26/67

DECLASSIFIED
NLJ 81-167
By DCA NARS, Date 9-6-83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C.F. (2)

NDA/C01-6
C0142
C0126

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 24, 1967, 2:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Denial of Report that Jordan has Declared War on Israel

The attached message from our Embassy in Jordan flatly denies the report received earlier indicating that Jordan had declared war on Israel.

Bromley Smith

Bromley Smith

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 MAY 24 18 05

CONFIDENTIAL

EHB974
****ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUQMKG 3742A 1441742
ZNY CCCCC
Z 241739Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2192
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE FLASH
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 393
STATE GRNC
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ AMMAN 3742

REF: STATE 200775

THIS REPORT NOT REPEAT NOT TRUE.

GP-3
BURNS
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-207
By LWB, NARA, Date 12-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 MAY 24 17 22

SAME DAY
67 MAY 24 PM 1:31

EHB973
PPPPZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 200775 1441703
ZNY CCCCC
Z 241707Z MAY 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMXG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 1878
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 1524
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 200775

SENSITIVE NEW YORK SOURCE AT 1 PM WASHINGTON TIME EDT INDICATES JORDAN HAS DECLARED WAR ON ISRAEL. YOUR COMMENTS REQUESTED SOONEST.

GP-3. RUSK
BT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-207
By ___, NARA, Date 12-4-91

C.F.

ND 19/201-6
CO126
PR8-2/5 +

May 24, 1967
Jewish War Veterans

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

SUBJECT: Malcolm Tarlov's Call on the President

Here are the pros for the President's seeing Tarlov:

--Any contact with the Jewish community will be reassuring and will help persuade them how deeply concerned and involved the President is.

--Tarlov, despite the furor kicked up after his meeting last fall with the President, did do a good job of explaining and upholding our policy in Vietnam during his February-March trip to Israel.

Against the President's seeing him are the tremendous costs of anyone's misquoting the President in this crisis. We can't afford to have anyone stating our commitment to Israel in any words other than those of the President or our diplomatic officers.

On balance, I should think it might be wise to beg off this time on grounds of the tremendous pressures on the President's time--unless you feel there is great domestic need for this kind of contact right now. My contacts lead me to believe that the President's statement last night has done a lot to calm the Jewish community, but you may have a different sense.

Walt Rostow

5-24-67 Told Patten we could of course, if necessary. WWR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC ltr. 4/16/81 re NLJ-80-110
By ltw, NARS, Date 8/11/81

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 14 1981
RECEIVED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

Malcolm Tarlov, National Commander of the Jewish War Veterans called today to say he is leaving Saturday for Israel. He would like very much to see the President sometime before he leaves on Saturday.

Marvin asked for your recommendation so we can memo the President. Will you let me know as soon as possible.

James R. Jones

C.F.

SP/FG430/Gruening, Ernest
ND19/CO1-6
CO126
FG105
CO16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

21204

December 16, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Senator Ernest Gruening's Speech

In accordance with Mr. Marvin Watson's request of December 13, there is enclosed a commentary on Senator Gruening's recent speech, "A Plan for Peace in the Middle East".

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Commentary

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 8-22-78 letter
By [illegible] NARS, Date 10-18-79

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.